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Over the past 40 years the central theme and organizing principle of
global political, military and economic existence has been the East-West
conflict. Now with the ending of the Cold War and international economic
restructuring, the primary global struggle may very well be transformed into a
North-South Conflict. This thesis examines the role of the Peoples Republic
of China in Third World affairs and the use of its self-proclaimed "Third
World Leader" posture as a mechanism for achieving its own goal of
becoming a full-fledged global power by the 21st century. In particular the
thesis focuses on China-Africa relations. China views the prospect of a "New
World Order" as a threat to the interests of the Third World. Consequently
China has embarked upon a diplomatic offensive designed to strengthen
political, economic and strategic relations with Africa as well as other Third
World nations. With nation states and politico-economic alliances changing
faster than many could imagine the PRC-Third World relations especially
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the ending of the Cold War and the disintegration of what was once
the Soviet Union, the world is entering a phase of restructuring in
international relations. At the forefront is the United States, asserting its role
as the dominant player, ushering in what President George Bush has
proclaimed to be "The New World Order." It is a new world order that is in
essence an international economic order based on democracy and a capitalistic
global "free market" economy. Consequently, world events over the last two
years have delineated the power centers of a world economy dominated by
three competitors—the United States, Japan and the European Community
(EC)—each with its own spheres of influence, special interests and special
relationships in the Third World.
Left out of this tripolar competition is the Third World, or Developing
Nations. China, (which considers itself the leader of the Third World
nations) contends that this "new world order" is merely a code word for U.S.
hegemony designed to attain an undisputed capacity to set the global agenda
on international political issues and facilitate exploitation of the Third
World. 1
Over the past 40 years the central theme and organizing principle of
global political, military and economic existence has been the East-West
conflict. Now, with the collapse of Soviet Union and international economic
^Zhenhuang, Z., "Building a Just World Order," Beijing Review, 12-18 August, 1991, p. 12.
restructuring the primary global struggle may well be transformed into a
North-South conflict Clearly China views the New World Order as a threat
to the interests of the Third World. With nation states and politico-economic
alliances changing faster than many had ever imagined, PRC-Third World
relations, especially PRC-African relations, deserve focused attention and
consideration.
Africa is a complex, struggling and unstable region. However, there may
be light at the end of the tunnel. In the past year several one-party rulers
were toppled. Africa is slowly moving toward democratization. While Africa
should not treated as a single entity chiefly because it is one continental land
mass, it is imperative that one recognize that there are over 50 diverse states
rich in natural resources. The strengthening of political, economic and
strategic relations with Africa as well as with other developing Third World
nations is a heady challenge to contemporary Chinese leadership. More
importantly, Chinese leadership among the African nations could strain
North-South relations and could provide China with the support it needs to
become a power broker on such international and regional issues as arms
control and regional conflicts.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of the People's Republic
of China in Third World affairs and the use of its self-proclaimed "Third
World leader" posture as a mechanism for achieving its own goal of
becoming a fully fledged global power by the 21 st Century. Utilizing a
regional approach I have limited my focus to Africa.2
The central hypothesis is that China perceives itself to be the de facto
leader of the Third World. As such, the PRC will seek to utilize its leadership
position in order to emerge ultimately as a truly global power capable of
challenging "Western Supremacy" and thus play a significant role in defining
the "New World Order." At the outset the genesis and evolution of Sino-
African relations will be examined. The relative depth of China's politico-
economic interests on the African continent will be carefully scrutinized. The
question will be asked whether the PRC has a genuine ideological interest
concerning African development or is PRC concern only part of an agenda
designed to coopt Third World nations into developing a New United Front
Strategy?
Chapter I examines the mutual interests of China and Africa. It explains
feelings of sympathy and reciprocity and uses the Tan-Zam as a case study in
the implementation of their respective policies.
Chapter II concentrates on the specific historical, ideological, and
geopolitical motives behind the policies pursued by various governments
from of Zhou En-Lai through Li Peng (1949-1989). The differences are noted
between rhetorical pronouncements and pragmatic compromises. For
convenience, the development of Chinese policies is divided into
chronological periods: 1949-1952, 1953-1957, 1958-1965, 1966-1969, 1970-1976,
^Africa, although the term in U.S. foreign policy denotes subsaharan Africa, for Chinese
foreign policy objectives North Africa will also be included in this study (Algeria, Egypt,
Libya, Morocco and Tunisia).
and 1977-1989. Within each period, attention will be drawn to the political,
economic, military/strategic and ideological concepts involved in the
formulation of China's African foreign policy.
Chapter III examines contemporary Sino-African foreign policy, 1990-
present, as affected by the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War and
disintegration of the Soviet Union. These are the key elements in
formulating the still vaguely defined "New World Order" and in shaping the
Chinese reactions. In a broader fashion, the chapter will examine the goals
and objectives of China with respect to the South Commission or Group of
77. The question will be asked whether a new Chinese leadership would be
more progressive, or perhaps more reactionary, in the implementation of
current policies.
Chapter IV addresses the problems that American policy makers face in
dealing with Sino-African relations. Historically, U.S. foreign policy towards
Africa has been defined in terms of the East-West conflict. 3 Now that the
Cold War is over and the Soviet Union and China no longer constitute an
ideological monolith, the U.S. must revamp its foreign policy towards Africa.
Clearly Africa is conflict-prone. Many of the conflicts are a result of the
colonial past with many states seeking autonomy. Consequently some very
real political and economic transitions are beginning to take shape that may
have far-reaching consequences. It is quite possible that China believes
African nations distrustful of the West will seek assistance in economic
development and technological knowledge from Asian countries, including
3 Kitchen, H., Some Guidelines on Africa for the Next, (Washington D.C. Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 1988), p. 1.
China. The thesis concludes addressing the effects of various Chinese-African
scenarios on the policies of the United States after examination of different
possible alternatives. Recommendations are suggested for policies that may
be in the best interests for Africa, for China, and for the United States.
A. GENESIS AND GROWTH OF SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS
Some experts contend that Africa does not in fact matter very much to
China. For example,
It is hard to make a case that Africa matters very much to China. The 45-
odd countries of the continent constitute roughly a quarter of all U.N.
members and something like a half of all developing states, but they
count for little in the overall scheme of Chinese foreign policy
objectives.4
However, the fact remains that China and Africa have deeply rooted
historical, social and economic ties dating back as early as the First Century
B.C. and reinforced by three major factors: race, colonialism and under-
development. However, the historical background of relations mattered very
little to China until the Cold War, which followed in the aftermath of World
War II.
China's interests—its objectives, motivations, and aspirations—have
only recently been aroused by the actions of the United States and the former
Soviet Union. To assist in understanding the recent development of Sino-
African relations, Appendix A contains a time line that begins in 1949 and
ends in 1992.
4Segal, G, Chirm and Africa, annals of the American Academy, Nol 519, January 1992, pp.
115-125, see also Lim, Z., "China's Third World Policy," in Chinese View of the World, ed.
Hao, Y., and Guocang, H., New York: Pantheon 1989, pp. 250-252.
Before the accession of the communists to power in Beijing the contacts
between the Chinese and Africans could be characterized as somewhat
remarkable in the sense that although there was significant commercial,
technical and nautical exchanges, the Chinese confined themselves to East
Africa without attempt or intention to impose influence on the life and
destinies of the population. The conduct of the early Chinese can only be
fully appreciated when contrasted to the persistent barbarism and exploitive
practices of the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Arabs, Persians and subsequent
colonial /racist policies of the European powers.5
After 1949, considerations of the Third World have been basic to China's
foreign policy objectives. For reasons both of ideology and national interest,
Africa became the primary component of that Third World policy and held
preeminent importance. Africa symbolized the ongoing revolutionary
struggle against capitalism and imperialism. Then, China's support for
several African states on the quest for self-determination provided instant
credibility in the region against "American Imperialism and Soviet
Revisionism." Finally, China, in turn, has received the support and
recognition of African states.6 This special reciprocity is best illustrated by the
support of African nations during the U.N. vote in which the PRC displaced
Taiwan as "China," in exchange for Chinese subsequent willingness to
undertake the building of the Tan-Zam Railway.
5Snow, P., The Star Raft: China's Encounter with Africa, New York: Cornell University
Press, 1988, pp. 1-36.
6Yu, G. T., China's African Policy, New York: Praeger, 1975, p. 11.
Specific Sino-African relations expanded within the global framework of
anti-imperialism and national development in the years before 1974. The
world witnessed a great anticolonial movement that impacted on China
which was still striving against its colonial period. The number of African
states in the United Nations grew from eight in 1959 to 42 in 1974. During
these same years both Taiwan and Beijing courted recognition from African
states. By 1971, Taiwan had begun normal diplomatic relations with three
African nations, Beijing with 26. It was at that juncture that a substantial
African vote supported the successful effort of the PRC to again its seat in the
United Nations.7
B. TANZANIA-ZAMBIA RAILWAY (TAN-ZAM) A CASE STUDY IN
COOPERATION
A consummate watershed event in Sino-African relations was the
extraordinary financial commitment undertaken by China in building the
Tanzania-Zambia Railway. The Tan-Zam Railway was unquestionably the
most important single foreign aid project undertaken to date by the Chinese.
The $400 million, 25-year no interest loan more than doubled its
commitment to the region. Adding even greater significance to the
undertaking was that the project commenced in 1965 which was at the onset
of the Cultural Revolution. Committing itself to a vast project despite a
paucity of resources not only enhanced China's credibility but produced
political gains in the region and international arena. 8
7Hutchinson, A., China's Africa Revolution, London: Western Press, 1975, p. 165.
8Yu, op. cit., p. 125.
Perhaps even more significant was that the Chinese built the railway
when no one else in the world would. The conception of the railway was
born in the British colonial era. Zambia, which gained its independence in
1964, was land-locked between what was then Southern Rhodesia and the
Portuguese-controlled Mozambiquan port of Beira. By having a rail link
between the Zambia copper belt to Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam, Zambia
would be able to achieve a greater degree of political and economic freedom
from then White-ruled Rhodesia and Mozambique.9
President Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) and President Kenneth Kaunda
(Zambia) sought support for the project from the West and the British /U.S.-
dominated World Bank. They were turned down with the explanation that
the railway served "no economic benefit."10 President Nyerere stated:
It was not as if we had alternate proposals, we should indeed welcome
Western offers, but the only firm offer we had was from China. 11
China's proposal was accepted immediately by Tanzania. After Zhou En-
Lai's 1965 visit to the Tanzanian capital of Dar es Salaam, a 12-man survey
team arrived to conduct an engineering survey at the request of President
Nyerere. Zambia's full commitment did not come until 1967 after President
Kaunda' s visit to Beijing. 12
9Ibid., p. 127 and Snow, op. tit., p. 151.
10Snow, op. tit. p. 151.
n Larkin, B., China and Africa 1949-1970: Foreign Policy of Peoples Republic of China, Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1971, pp. 99-100.
12Ibid.
8
The contracts were signed on September 5, 1967 in Beijing by Fang Yi,
(Minister of Economic Relations) and the finance ministers of Tanzania and
Zambia. Two more rounds of talks followed, to work out the technical
aspects of the projects, in Dar es Salaam (1968) and Lusaka (1969). The final
agreement was signed in Beijing on July 12, 1970. 13
The construction of the Tan-Zam Railway (named Tazara) commenced
immediately following inauguration ceremonies of the rail link on October
12, 1970. Chinese engineers and construction workers along with Tanzanian
trainees began laying railway on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam. Two years
later, on August 25, 1973, the Tanzanian portion of Tazara was complete and
the Zambia construction began. In September 1975, Tazara was complete, two
years ahead of schedule and much to the chagrin of skeptics.
Tazara was a massive project. "It was the longest railway in Africa and
the longest railway complete anywhere on the planet since the end of the
Second World War." 14 The Chinese-Tanzanian-Zambian workforce (see
Table 1) built 300 bridges, six miles of tunnel, 93 railway stations (which when
linked up with Zambia rail systems would be expanded to 147), imported 85
mainline diesel locomotives, 17 shunting locomotives, 2100 freight wagons
and 100 coaches. 15 In addition, China also developed training schools for
13Yu, George T. "The Tanzania-Zambia Railway: A Case Study in Chinese Economic Aid
to Africa," in Soviet and Chinese Aid to African 'Nations, edited by Warren Weinstein and
Thomas Henricksen (New York: Praeger), 1984, p. 125.
14Snow, op. cit., p. 154.
15 Yu, op. cit., p. 137, and Snow, op. cit., p. 154.
Zambians and Tanzanians in Dar es Salaam as well as shipped trainees to
China to attend the Northern China Communications University. 16
TABLE 1. TAZARA FORCE FORCE, 1972-74

















(Source: Adapted from Yu, George T. "The Tanzania-Zambia Railway: A
Case Study in Chinese Economic Aid to Africa," in Soviet and Chinese Aid to
African Nations, edited by Warren Weinstein and Thomas Henricksen (New
York: Praeger), 1984, p. 125.
Upon completion of Tazara the Chinese workforce returned to China
immediately. The Chinese fully intended to leave Tazara operations to the
complete autonomy of Tanzania and Zambia. Unfortunately, Tanzania and
Zambia did not have the technical know-how to run such an extensive
16 Ibid.
10
operation and problems developed. Consequently, after a tripartite meeting
in 1978, China agreed not to withdraw the technical expertise and to continue
to provide for training.
There are several reasons why the Tanzam Railway can be considered
especially significant in the evolution of Sino-African relations. First, until
this undertaking, Chinese support was considered to be more symbolic than
material. Second, completion of the railway provided psychological
invigoration for both Chinese and Africans by demonstrating technological
prowess, energy and politico/economic largesse. Third, the fact that the
project was completed during a period of international conflict in China
proved that internal conflicts would not impede China's foreign policy
commitments. Fourth, China could now guarantee itself access to Zambian
copper and other vital exports. Last and most important, China gained trust,
and prestige while solidifying the spirit of cooperation in the region and
catapulted itself into the international arena as a force to be reckoned with. 17
The long-term expansion of the Chinese economy was based upon a
proliferation of heavy industrial of "blue steel" enterprise. Indeed, the
pattern of Chinese economic growth was consciously directed by the party
apparatus. In keeping with fundamental Marxist-Leninist principles, the goal
of the industrialization program was to transform what was still basically an
agrarian subsistence economy into a full-fledged industrial power. In this
basic sense China still operated within ideologically Marxism-Leninism.
17Larkin, op. tit., p. 102 and Yu, op. tit., p. 143-145.
11
The key to understanding all of China's concerns with its position in
Africa lies in appreciating the long-term implications of China's domestic
ideological and economic goals. As the scale and pace of China's
industrialization grows the need for raw materials and export markets for
subsequent production grows at an exactly parallel rate. While Africa is beset
by a host of problems, enormous debt, drought, starvation and tribal conflict,
it is still, nonetheless, an vital source of strategic raw material and
commodities.
There are other very basic economic considerations that serve as
incentives to Chinese policy. China is equally aware of Africa's potential as a
market In spite of this economic potential, Africa is responsible for less than
2% of world gross economic product.18 Its overall economic development has
been in a condition of severe decline during the same period that the western
industrial nations have experienced unprecedented economic growth. Given
this set of conditions, the potential for economic growth on the Africa sub-
continent is extraordinary to say the least. From the Chinese perspective
Africa represents far more than simply a source of raw materials but also an
expanding marketplace to sell finished products and establish the types of
symbiotic relationships that fuel mutual long-term economic expansion.
18
"Global Growth was Weaker than Expected in 1991, says IMF Staff," IMF Survey, Vol.
21, No. 11, 15 May 1992, pp. 162-164.
Actual growth for Africa in 1991 was 1.4%. Projected growth for the region in 1992 is 2.7%.
12
II. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN
AFRICA 1949-1989
Since 1949, Chinese foreign policy has undergone a myriad of changes and
continuing development. This chapter examines China's foreign policy in
Africa for the years between 1949 and 1989. As stated in the introduction, the
Third World, particularly, Africa, has been a cornerstone in determining
China's foreign policy objectives. While there are a variety of opinions
regarding the ultimate goals of China's foreign policy, one can assume that it
is based on the four factors that determine every nation's policies: security,
ideology, domestic political/economic development and the international
environment. These factors, along with the transitions in ideology from one
of doctrine (1949) to a more pragmatic approach (1989-present), will be
examined.
A. "LEAN ON ONE SIDE"1949-1952
Since inception, the primary objective of the PRC has been threefold:
preserving national unity, sovereignty, national development and restoring
territorial integrity. 19 The twin traumas of its birth, civil and foreign war and
the fact that once-born, the PRC found itself sandwiched between two global
powers engaged in the Cold War, proved to be the decisive factors in
determining foreign policy and behavior. As a means of guaranteeing its
19 Chinese View of the World, ed. Hao, Y., and Guocang, H., (New York: Pantheon 1989),
p. xvii.
13
security against foreign invasion and procuring assistance with its own
agenda of domestic ideological development, the PRC adopted a "lean on one
side" policy in alliance with the Soviet Union20 .
Most 20th Century contact contact between China and the African states
had been exiguous at best prior to 1955. The majority of interactions were the
direct result of PRC delegates being present at Soviet sponsored international
functions. Though a few African leaders visited China, none of the four
autonomous African states—Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa
—
extended diplomatic recognition to China. The most interest Mao displayed
in African affairs was when he sent a cable to South Africa in July 1950
protesting impending Apartheid legislation on the grounds that it would
discriminate against the Chinese living there21 . Despite scant contact there
was a great deal of optimism among the Chinese leaders that communist
ideology would soon triumph in Asia and Africa. China believed that its
revolution was the proper model to follow in the struggle for
independence22 . Mao stated
Why was Abyssinia extinguished? First it was not only a weak country,
but also a small country. Second, it was not as advanced as China; it was
an ancient country passing from slave to the serf system, had no
capitalism, no bourgeois political parties, much less a Communist Party;
had no army like China's, much less an army like the Eighth Route
Army.... Quite a large-scale guerrilla war still persists in Abyssinia, and if
20 Yu, op. cit, p. 2.
21 Larkin, op. cit., p. 15-16.
^Cooley, op. cit., p. 6.
14
the Abyssinians can only persevere, they will be able to reoccupy and
revive their fatherland in a future fluctuation of world affairs.23
The period ended with China closely aligned with the Soviet Union and
in direct conflict with the United States as a result of the Korean War.
B. THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE AND THE AFRO-ASIAN ALLIANCE
1953-1959
The second period in Chinese foreign policy witnessed the attempts of the
PRC to spread its wings independent of its big brother, the Soviet Union.
With its internal power consolidated, its domestic policy on track and a
feeling of relative security in its alliance with the Soviets, the PRC set out to
win friends. Although the PRC's primary objective was to preserve and
protect its eastern and southern flanks against a perceived threat of aggression
from the United States, the PRC also sought a way out of isolationism. This
period also denotes the beginning of the Sino-Soviet split. Until this time,
the Soviets were perceived as the leader of all socialist states. The death of
Stalin and The Non-Aligned Conference of Afro-Asian Nations at Bandung
clearly changed that.24
1. Non-Aligned Conference of Afro-Asian Nations (Bandung)
The African-Asian Conference, 1955, catapulted China onto the
African scene and exposed the divergent ideological concepts of the Soviets
and PRC. As early as three years prior to the Sino-Soviet split; it became clear
that the Soviets and PRC possessed conflicting ideology in attaining African
23 Snow, op. cit., p. 68.
24 Yu, op. cit., pp. 2-3.
15
support. For example, on the one hand, the Soviets appealed to the African
states from a material perspective and the promise of economic aid. On the
other hand, the PRC, unable to compete in terms of hard currency, focused on
the heart, minds and fears of Africans by emphasizing race consciousness.
While the Soviet action consisted of aid and credits; Chinese officials such as
Kuo-Mo-Jo spoke of a common cultural heritage of the non-whites of Asia,
and Africa. 25 Another delegate, Chu Tu Nan, asserted that "Chinese, Indians,
Arabs, Africans shared a common heritage of oppression and of rich ancient
cultures that had been destroyed by western imperialism." Chu asserted that
the only alternative was a concerted effort by the non-white world to develop
a new civilization incorporating their lost traditions with socialism.26 Clearly
China sought to create solidarity based on being non-white, non-European,
and having the common experience of being a "poverty-stricken country
exploited by 'foreign devils' ever since the Fifteenth Century, when the first
Portuguese caravels touched the coasts of Africa and the Orient."27 More
significant was Chinese support for the FLN in Algeria's quest for self-
determination, a cause which the Soviets did not support.28
1. The Legacy of Bandung
The Asian-African (Bandung) Conference took place in Bandung,
Indonesia. Of the 29 participating countries, six members were from Africa
—
25 Cooley, op. cit., p. 18.
26 Ibid., p. 16.
27 Ibid.
28Larkin, op. cit., p. 27
16
Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (Ghana), Liberia, Libya and the Sudan—with
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco as observers. The Soviets and United States
were not wanted because they were neither African nor Asian. During the
conference Zhou En-Lai took the opportunity to expand "the five principles
of coexistence" to a modified version tailored for anti-imperialism as applied
to Africa29 .
1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity.
2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.




8. Equality of all nations.
9. Respect for freedom to choose political and economic systems.
10. Mutually beneficial relations between nations.
Very few African issues were discussed at Bandung, but the imagery
of Afro-Asian solidarity became attractive political /ideological concepts.
More importantly Zhou,
succeeded in creating an impression that there existed a united front of
communist and neutralists based upon common conviction that
western colonialism and western military pacts were the only real
dangers threatening independence of the new nations of Asia and
Africa^.
29Hevi, John Emmanuel. The Dragon Embrace: Chinese Communists in Africa. (New York:
Praegar Publishers, 1966), p. 7.
30 Brzezinski, Zbiegniew. Africa in the Communist World, Stanford University Press,
1963, p. 155.
17
The conference ended with a final communique supporting
Tunisian, Algerian and Moroccan right to self-determination. In a paragraph
dedicated to racism Zhou En-Lai articulated PRC policy "We have always
regarded that different races are equal. New China has not practiced
discrimination."31
2. The Suez Crisis, 1956
During the Bandung Conference Zhou actively cultivated the
Egyptian leader Abdul Nasser, and the PRC was formally recognized by Egypt
on 5 May 1956 with full diplomatic relations being established on November
30, 1956. Realizing the importance of African issues, the PRC then established
a new office of West Asian and African Affairs in the foreign ministry. With
the exception of aid to the Algerian Revolutionary Army and pledges of
support for Arabs in their struggle against Israel, little direct military interest
was evident. This changed dramatically with the Suez Crisis. Not only was
the Sino-Soviet rivalry beginning to heat up but the Suez (a vital strategic
waterway) became a target for Chinese attention. When Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev vowed to send rockets against the West if Anglo and French
attacks did not cease, China responded by sending $5,000,000 and vowed to
send 300,000 volunteers as well.32
When Egypt gained control of the Suez from the British, Zhou took
the opportunity to articulate the strength of the so-called Afro-Asian
Movement. Chou En-Lai stated in March 1957
31 Larkin, op. cit., p. 19.
32 Larkin, op. cit., p. 25.
18
[Suez] was a great revelation to us, showing that the Asian and African
countries are not yet powerful in material strength, all aggression by the
colonialists can be frustrated, as long as we maintain our solidarity and
firmly unite with all peace-loving forces of the world and wage a
resolute struggle.33
3. Afro-Asian Solidarity Council (AAPSO)
The period ended with the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in 1957.
From the conference and in accordance with President Nasser's desires, the
Afro-Asian Solidarity Council (AAPSO) evolved. The organization was
located in Cairo and chaired by Anwar Sadat. Egypt had clearly desired to
control key posts but the influence of Soviets and the PRC came to dominate
the organization. The PRC and Soviets engaged in incessant arguments
which ultimately served to the advantage of the PRC. Africa was rapidly
changing. Morocco, Tunisia and Ghana all achieved independence. The
Suez Crisis, along with the Algerian uprising, stimulated the movement
against western imperialism. With the Afro-Asian Council devoted
exclusively to the anticolonial struggle, China was able to forge new contacts
and challenge the Soviets for leadership of the socialist camp. The Chinese,
after all, were an authentic Asian power while the Soviets were admitted as
"Asians honoris causa." 34 By the time the Council completed its first year of
work, China had not only successfully placed more delegates but had also
pledged more money than the Soviets ($28,000 to $25,200) for the coming
33 Ibid., p. 25 and Hutchinson, op. cit., p. 17.
34 Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 155.
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year. 35 The Council clearly represented a tremendous opportunity for the
PRC to pursue its objective of becoming the leader of the Third World.
C UNITED FRONT STRATEGY AND THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT 1958-1965
The third period began with China experiencing severe domestic
problems as well as even more strained relations with the Soviet Union. A
poor harvest in 1956 coupled with lagging economic development,
Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, and an inadequate level of Soviet aid,
compelled China to reassess its situation. Thus on 1 March 1958 Mao
announced the "Great Leap Forward" designed to accelerate economic
development independent of the Soviet economic model. According to Mao,
"Stalin had paid attention only to half of the factors that promote economic
development: technique, but not politics; cadres but not masses; industry but
not agriculture; the constraints imposed by objective conditions, but not the
potential created by man's subjective will."36
The implementation of the "Great Leap Forward" was a clear challenge to
the Soviet model of communism and a rejection of Soviet policies. Over the
next two years the rift widened. China became disenchanted by the Soviet
hesitancy to provide support to the regional agenda of the PRC, such as the
liberation of the offshore islands, annexation of Tibet and the serious border
clashes with India. As a result, the PRC initiated a fundamental reassessment
of its position in international relations. Lack of definitive Soviet support as
35Ibid., pp. 155-157.
36Harding, Harry, Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949-1976, California,
Stanford University Press, 1981, p. 172.
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well as the Soviets' interest in a more managed relationship with the United
States convinced China that the Soviets were no longer committed to the
revolutionary cause.37
By 1960 the Sino-Soviet split was fully recognized and the "U.S.-Soviet-
China Strategic Triangle" was born. The split was significant for several
reasons. First, it signified a complete break with the Soviets not only on the
domestic front but also in the area of the foreign policy and revolutionary
agenda. Second, the Chinese leadership had made a conscious effort to end
the relationship in order to preserve its vision of socialist national
development. Third, the Third World became China's primary focus in
foreign policy, with Africa at the center. Fourth, China's new position
represented an "internationalization" of foreign policy that stood in
opposition to the hegemonic ambitions of the Soviet Union and the United
States. It was also significant that China sought to formulate a new
international strategy that could counter the revisionist metamorphosis of
Soviet-style socialism. 38 Chinese policy makers anticipated that anti-
Revisionism and anti-imperialism would meet with equal enthusiasm in
Third World. In 1965 Lin Piao stated
Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be
called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa and Latin American
constitute "the rural areas of the world." Since World War II, the
proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been
temporarily held back in North America and West European capitalist
37 Yu, George T., "The Tanzania-Zambia Railway: A Case Study in Chinese Economic Aid
to Africa in" Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations. Ed. Thomas H. Hendrickson and
Warren Weinstein, New York: Praeger, 1984, p. 3.
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countries, while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa
and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the
contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the
encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole
cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggle of the
Asian, African and Latin American people who make up the
overwhelming majority of the world's population. The socialist
countries should regard it as their international duty to support the
people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America.39
China sought to construct a new Revolutionary Strategy premised upon the
commonality of the Third World in the struggle for economic and social
development. Africa was central—the testing ground where this new strategy
would be implemented.
1. Zhou En-Lai and the United Front Strategy
The doctrine of "The United Front" as a fundamental principle of
Marxist-Leninism, is defined as "a united and temporary alignment between
a community party or state and one or more non-communist political units
with the dual purpose, on the communist side, of confronting a common
enemy and furthering the revolutionary cause."40 Throughout the period
1960-1965, the United Front strategy was an essential component of Chinese
foreign policy, linking its ideology with its conduct in foreign affairs.
After China's venture into African affairs during the Suez Crisis, by
I960, at the height of the anti-colonialist movement Africa, China was
showing considerable interest in the long-term prospects for revolution in
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Armstrong, J. D., Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and United Front
Doctrine, (California: University of California, Berkeley, Press, 1971), pp. 13-14.
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Africa. 41 China perceived of Africa as the perfect medium for revolutionary
struggle and its strategy was to encourage four trends in political
consciousness: anti-imperialism, support for the African national liberation
movements, the pursuit of self-reliance and furtherance of Afro-Asian
solidarity.42 Thus China's strategy in Africa developed into creating a broad
united front directed against the practice of external imperialism while
simultaneously assisting in the foment of internal revolution.
Zhou En-Lai visited ten African nations between December 14, 1963
and February 4, 1964 in an attempt to promulgate these views and assess the
reaction. Zhou stated:
The purpose of my visit is to enhance the mutual understanding
between China, and the friendly African countries, strengthen the
traditional friendship and cooperation between China and the African
countries, increase our knowledge and learn useful things from African
people.43
Zhou, on this tour to Africa, wanted to somehow gauge African
perceptions of Asia and to break the "isolate and contain" policy that the U.S.
had imposed upon the PRC. He also wished to establish a bond of solidarity
and brotherhood with progressive African leaders. Zhou was accompanied to
Africa by Chen Yi and an entourage of about forty. Their itinerary included
Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Tunisia, the Sudan, Ethiopia
and Somalia, the primarily Arabic or Arabized nations. (Snow, pp. 74-76)
41 Ibid., p. 216.
42 Ibid., p. 218.
43
"Premier Chou en Lai Answers Newsmen's Questions in Accra," Peking (Beijing) Review,
No. 4, 24 January 1964, p. 15.
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Throughout the tour Zhou emphasized '"the dichotomous nature of
China's policies' with Zhou playing on contrapuntal themes of peace and
struggle, progress and poverty, weakness and strength, cooperation and
opposition." (Hutchinson, p. 62) Zhou patiently explained such Chinese
policies in opposition to the Test Ban Treaty and tactfully promulgated his
ideology by unveiling a revised version of "The Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence."44
1. China supports the African and Arab peoples in their struggle to
oppose imperialism and old and new colonialism and to win and safe-
guard national independence.
2. It supports the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-
alignment by the governments of the African and Arab countries.
3. It supports the desire of the African and Arab peoples to achieve unity
and solidarity in the manner of their own choice.
4. It supports the African and Arab countries in their efforts to settle their
disputes through peaceful negotiations.
5. It holds that the sovereignty of the African and Arab countries should
be respected by all other countries and that encroachment and
interference from any quarter should be opposed.
Despite Zhou's anti-imperialist appeal, his arguments were not
received as wholeheartedly as he had anticipated. He was constantly
reminded of the shortcomings of China's policies everywhere he went. The
African nations wanted money, not weapons and rhetoric. In Egypt he was
shown the Soviet-built Aswan Dam. In Algeria he learned very quickly that
some Africans did not accept China as the titular leader of the revolutionary
struggle in Africa. They gladly accepted China's assistance, but this was an
44
"Premier Chou en Lai: Revolutionary Prospects in Africa Excellent," Peking (Beijing)
Review., No. 7., 14 February 1964, p. 7.
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African struggle to be won or lost by Africans. In Morocco he was faced with
the claims of King Hassan that the Soviets were backing the Algerians. In
Ghana, once again he had to compete with Soviet influence and monetary
aid. In East Africa, his delegation represented the first Chinese visit of the
century. In fact the Africans were challenging the Chinese to put their money
where their mouth was. More importantly, the African leaders told Zhou
that they did not completely accept Chinese ideology. Nor did they accept the
idea that the United States was the leading imperialist threat.4546
Zhou went to Africa with the objective of teaching the Africans how
to distinguish between their "enemies and friends." (Hutchinson pp. 126-147)
What followed was a series of setbacks. Although China was successful in
linking ideological formulations with actual situations in some instances (i.e.
backing opposition movements in Kenya, Cameroon, the Congo, Burundi
and Rwanda) Chinese intentions were viewed with suspicion. Subsequent to
Zhou's tour Chinese delegations were expelled from several African nations
for subversive activities (see Table 2) In addition, Zhou left the continent
without obtaining full support for the Chinese position in the Sino-Soviet
dispute. However Zhou did learn some valuable lessons, the most important
being that Africa was diverse and beholden to no one superpower or ideology.
45 Hutchinson, op. tit., pp. 126-147 and Clough, Michael, Free at Last?: U.S. Policy
towards Africa and the End of the Cold War, New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press,
1992, p. 7.
46 During 1960 campaign, President Kennedy asserted that "we lost ground in Africa
because we have neglected and ignored the needs and aspirations of African people." The result
was a U.S. diplomatic offensive aimed at wooing African leaders.
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Burundi 1962 1963; relations suspended in 1965,
restored in 1971
Cameroon 1960 1972
Central African Republic 1960 1964; relations suspended in 1966
Chad 1960 1972
Congo (Brazzaville) 1960 1964
Dahomey 1960 1964; relations suspended in 1966,
restored in 1972
Equatorial Guinea 1968 1970
Ethiopia — 1970





Malagasy Republic 1960 1972
Mauritania 1960 1965











Tunisia 1956 1064; relations suspended in 1967,
restored in 1971
Uganda 1962 1962
United Arab Republic (Egypt) 1922 1956
Zambia 1964 1964
Zaire 1960 1972
Note: Tanganyika gained its independence in 1961 and entered into diplomatic relations with
China in the same year; Zanzibar won independence in 1963, and relations with China began in
the same year. The union of the two states was achieved in 1964.
(Source: Yu, George T., China's Foreign Policy, a Study of Tanzania, New
York: Praeger Press, 1975).
47Yu, 1975, op. at., p. 8
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Prior to Zhou's tour, China's approach to Africa was based on its own
revolutionary experience and ideology rather than a knowledge of African
conditions and aspirations. China had overestimated the potential impact of
antirevisionist and anti-imperialist rhetoric and its relative importance to
African nations. The African nations had given China a "wake up call"
which let them know their ideological preconceptions were wrong and the
assumption that "Africa was bound to follow the direct course of China's
revolutionary map" was invalid.48
After the tour, Zhou embarked on an all out offensive on the
diplomatic, economic and revolutionary front in order to gain friends and to
establish China as the leader of a broad united front in the Third World. The
first priority was to convene a second Bandung Conference in 1965. During
the AAPSO Conference 1964 preparatory meeting in* Djakarta, China
vehemently opposed Soviet participation on the basis that they were neither
African nor Asian. (Snow, p. 120) This action led to Soviet charges of race
baiting by the Chinese. In a letter to the participating countries, the Soviets
contended that the Chinese were attempting
... to install little by little an attitude of suspicion towards many peoples
of socialist countries merely because they are whites ... The PRC
government preaching of race is no more than a false cloak for its
ambitions of hegemony among the Afro-Asian countries.49
The controversy and period ended with the cancellation of the
Second Bandung Conference, which had been scheduled for 1965, which was
48 Larkin, op at., p. 199.
49
"For Unity in the Struggle for Peace, Freedom and National Independence: Statement by
the Soviet Government," New Times, No. 19, 1964, p. 32.
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an additional blow to China's psyche and agenda. Nevertheless, there were
lessons learned from the period. With regard to the united front strategy and
its effect on China's behavior, wide gaps appeared between its statements and
its actual performance. China's united front strategy had five shortcomings
that had precluded its successful implementation. First, the PRC believed
that it already possessed extensive influence throughout the Third World and
therefore developed policies aimed at long-term objectives rather than first
securing and cementing its tentative alliances. Second, China's entire
perception of indigenous African movements had been erroneously distorted
to conform to China's Revolutionary experience. Third, China had linked its
international initiatives to its own strategic requirements, thereby arousing
the suspicion of Africans. Fourth, China's preoccupation with the Vietnam
War (which China intended making a major topic before Second Bandung
Conference in 1964 [which was cancelled]) slowed the momentum of Chinese
activities. And fifth, the rigid commitment to a United Front had resulted in
too many constraints and tactical limitations while dealing with individual
countries. 50 Regrouping from these setbacks China made a conscientious
effort to redirect its focus away from North and West Africa towards East
Africa. Specifically Tanzania, where, because of the setbacks elsewhere, China
wisely sought firsthand knowledge of Tanzanian culture and politics and
developed its policies accordingly. Although China's new foreign policy, as
well as the Great Leap Forward, were failures on a grand scale, China has
nonetheless succeeded in achieving the status of an international player.
50 Armstrong, op. cit., p. 237.
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D. CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ISOLATIONISM (1966-1969)
This period can be generally characterized as one of setbacks, in the
international arena. By 1966 China was firmly enveloped in the "Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution." As a result, Sino-African relations were
substantially suspended, with the exception of the East African nations,
particularly Tanzania.
The Cultural Revolution created a very negative international image for
China and adversely affected its relations in Africa. Bruce Larkin states five
hypotheses as the basis of the wide-scale diminution of China's position in
Africa:51
1. The efficiency and effectiveness of Chinese embassies in Africa
suffered: ambassadors and staff members were called home for
extended stays.
2. Supporting facilities in China were preoccupied with internal disputes
which interfered with training of foreign students.
3. Moderate economic recession may have increased competition for
funds.
4. The Cultural Revolution showed that there was no single "Chinese
Path to Socialism."
5. The vastness and audacity of the Cultural Revolution made it more
difficult for China to conduct a united front strategy.
Though the Cultural Revolution slowed down China's revolutionary
strategy in Africa, some forward movement was still achieved. The most
successful venture was that of the Tan-Zam Railway, as described above,
which required an enormous financial commitment on the part of China.
Moreover, China continued to funnel aid (in form of credits) to development
51 Larkin, op. tit., pp. 144-145.
29
projects in such states as Guinea ($10 million), Somalia ($3 million), Mali ($4
million), and Algeria ($2 million).52 These were constructive policies that
allowed China at least to keep up the appearance that its deep commitment to
African development was still ongoing.
On the other side of the coin, China suffered some significant political
setbacks in the form of broken relations with failed revolutionary
movements. Until this period its largest defeat was in the Congo in 1960.
The Congo had been a playing field where the Soviet Union, the U.S. and
China had all vigorously competed. According to Mao "If we can take the
Congo, we can have all of Africa!"53 China backed the government of Patrice
Lamumba but how solid China's ties to the revolutionaries were is a matter
of question. In fact China attempted to keep its involvement secret
throughout the struggle.54 In addition, revolutions and coups d'etat led to
the suspension of diplomatic relations in Burundi, Central Africa Republic,
Dahomey, Ghana and Tunisia.
The period ended with China having to reestablish its position and
credibility in the African communities. An increase of support for
revolutionary movements throughout Africa (See Table 3) was the goal of a
policy designed to establish intimate ties with the movements which would
eventually attain power. The Chinese hoped that their investment and
52 Ibid., p. 81
°3 Hutchinson, op. cit., p. 81 and Larkin, op. cit., p. 168.
54 Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 178
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commitment would find fruition in the form of African support in Beijing's
quest for a seat in the United Nations.
TABLE 3. SOVIET AND CHINESE SUPPORT OF MAJOR NATIONAL
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS TO 1970
Certain or Probable Recipient of
Support from












Angola Movimento Popoular de Libertacao
de Angola (MPLA)
Uniao Nacional Para a
Independencia total de Angola
(UNITA)












Partido Africano da Independencia
da Guin£ e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) PAIGC
Rhodesia Zimbabwe African People's Union
(ZAPU)
Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU) ZANU
ZAPU
South Africa African National Congress (ANC)






South-West African National Union
(SWANU) SWANU
SWAPO
(Source: Larkin, B., China and Africa 1949-1970: Foreign Policy of Peoples
Republic of China, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971, pp. 188.)
E 1970-1979—CHINA'S REEMERGENCE IN AFRICA
After the military clash in the Sino-Soviet border in 1969, it became clear
that the Soviets posed the greatest and most immediate threat to China's
security. In response to the Soviet threat, China initiated a series of overtures
to the U.S. which resulted in a Sino-American rapprochement and the visits
31
of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon-55
At this juncture, China stepped up its activities in Africa.
The Sino-Soviet conflict had been smoldering throughout the 1960s. By
1970, when China emerged from the Great Proletariat Revolution it was ready
to challenge and resist the Soviet threat. Africa was the perfect arena for the
battle. 56 Thus in 1970, China embarked upon an unparalleled diplomatic
offensive in Africa. The culmination of its efforts were realized by a
significant enhancement of Chinese influence on African affairs and the
much cherished admission to the United Nations. China achieved such
successful results by accelerating its participation on three major fronts
—
economic aid, diplomatic relations and arms transfer.
1. Economic Aid
One of the first initiatives undertaken in 1970 was an increase in
economic aid to African countries. China had learned from its experiences
during the period 1954-1966 that the African leadership was far more
responsive to money than rhetoric. China accordingly tripled its monetary
commitment and became the primary source of aid to Africa, supplanting the
Soviet Union. In order to fully appreciate the scale and depth of China'
initiative (see Table 4) a contrast with the Soviet program needs to be made.
First, China contributed aid to more African countries than the Soviet Union
(29 to 22). Second, China's contributions were much more geographically
55Pollack, Jonathan, China in the Evolving International System, (California: RAND,
1983), p. 8.
56 Yu, 1980, op. cit., p. 169.
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dispersed while the Soviets primarily contributed the aid to the North
African nations. Third, China contributed aid to to a greater number of
emerging nations than did the Soviets (23 to ll).57 Finally, in comparing
figures for the periods 1954-1966 to 1970-1979, China increased economic aid
from $428 million in 1966 to $1945 in 1979. In contrast Soviet aid decreased
from $1900 million to $113 million during the identical period. (Yu, 1980, pp.
169-171)
The increase in aid witnessed by African nations affirmed China's




TABLE 4. CHINESE AND SOVIET AID COMMITMENTS TO AFRICA, 1954-
66 AND 1970-79
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
1954-66 1970-79 1979
China USSR China USSR China USSR
Algeria 52 236 - 479 -
Angola - - - 10 -
Benin - - 44 - -
Burundi - - 60 - 40
Cameroon - 8 71 -
Central African Empire 4 - - 2 -
Chad - - 50 2 -
Congo 25 10 - 4 -
Egypt 85 1,001 28 299 -
Equatorial Guinea - - - 1 -
Ethiopia - 102 85 95 -
Gambia - - 17 -
Ghana 42 93 - 1
Guinea-Bissau - - 17 14
Kenya 18 48 - -
'
Liberia - - 10 -
Madagascar - - 66 -
Mali 55 59 4 -
Mauritania - - 59 1 -
Mauritius • - 35 -
Morocco - 44 32 44 -
Mozambique - - 59 2
Niger - - 51 2
Nigeria - - - 7
Rwanda - - 22 1
Senegal - 7 49 2
Sierra Leone - 28 30 -
Somalia 22 66 111 87
Sudan - 22 82 -
Tanzania 54 20 305 19
Togo - - 45 -
Tunisia - 34 97 55 -
Uganda 15 16 -
Upper Volta - - 52 1
Zaire - - 100 -
Zambia - - 290 -
TOTALS $428 $1,900 $1,945 $1,135
Source: Adapted and compiled by author from George T. Yu, Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Africa, in
David E. Albright, ed., Communism in Africa, and Central Intelligence Agency, Communist Aid




Over a nine year period China had aggressively campaigned to win
African nations over to its side of the Sino-Soviet conflict. By 1979 China had
forged diplomatic ties with 26 additional nations, bring the total to 42 (Table
5). The diplomatic initiatives were pointedly successful in light of China's
refusal to establish relations with any nation that recognized Taiwan. (By way
of contrast, Taiwan established relations with only three nations.)
China also received a substantial number of African heads of state
and representatives in Beijing (Table 6 refers). Conferring the pomp of state
ceremony upon the visiting delegations was clearly designed to enhance
mutual prestige and help to diminish the Soviet power base in Africa by
painting the Soviets as imperialist.
In the perception of Chinese leadership, the Soviets had three
principal objectives in Africa. First, to exploit the natural resources of the
continent such as copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold and uranium. Second, to
advance Soviet strategic interests in the competition with the U.S. for world
hegemony and third, to prevent African unity.58
China continuously sought to expose any Soviet action which would
bring Soviet intentions and loyalty under the questioning scrutiny of Third
World nations. In the case of Africa, China pointed out the lack of Soviet
support for Algeria in 1950, the Congolese in 1960, and in the Arab-Israeli
58 Ibid., pp. 186-187.
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wars, which had denied the Arab people the right of "Waging a just war
against the Israeli aggressor."59
TABLE 5. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S NEW DIPLOMATIC


















































Source: Adopted from George T. Yu, Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Africa, 1980.
18.
59 New China News Agency, "Look at its Past and You Can Tell its Present," 9 Dec. 1975, p.
60Libya had unilaterally announced recognition of China in 1971 but had continued to
maintain relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan.
36
TABLE 6. MAJOR AFRICAN DELEGATIONS TO CHINA, 1971-197961
Year Leader of Delegation
1971 President of the Liberations Front of Mozambique
1971 Deputy President of Sudan
1972 President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somalia
1972 Vice-president of Zambia
1973 President of Zaire
1973 President of Cameroon
1973 President of the Congo
1973 Preside of Sierra Leone
1974 President of Zambia
1974 President of Senegal
1974 Vice-president of the Supreme Military Council of Niger
1974 President of Togo
1974 Head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria
1974 President of Mauritania
1974 President of Gabon
1975 President of the Liberation Front of Mozambique
1975 President of Gambia
1975 President of Sao Tome and Principe
1976 President of Malagasy Republic
1976 President of Benin
1976 President of Botswana
1976 President of the Central African Republic
1976 Vice-president of Tanzania
1977 President of Mauritania
1977 President of Gabon
1977 President of Sudan
1977 Prime Minister of the Congo
1977 Vice-president of Somalia
1977 General Secretary of the Zimbabwe African National Union
1977 President of the Supreme Military Council of Niger
1977 President of Cameroon
1978 Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt
1978 Minister of the Supreme Military Council of Ghana
1978 President of Somalia
1978 President of Seychelles
1978 President of Mozambique
1978 President of the Congo
1978 President of Rwanda
1978 President of Liberia
1978 President of Gabon
1979 President of Burundi
Source: Adapted and compiled by author from George T. Yu, Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Africa, in
David E. Albright, ed., Communism in Africa, 1980, p. 174.
61Through March 1979 only.
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3. Anns Transfers
In terms of arms supplies, the Soviet Union still outdistanced China
in the volume of arms transfer. (Table 7) Arms sales were not a focal point of
Chinese foreign policy during this era. In fact China continuously criticized
the Soviet Union for providing arms but nothing else. The majority of
Chinese arms transfers took place in the period 1974-1979, in response to the
war in Angola.
TABLE 7. CHINESE AND SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS TO AFRICA, 1967-79
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
































Source: WMEAT World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1967-1979, Washington,
DC, 1980.
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Through Zaire and Tanzania, China backed, trained and supplied
arms to all three liberation movements in the conflict with Portugal—the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union
for the total independence of Angola, and the National Front for the
Liberation of Angola (FLNA). When the Portuguese were overthrown in
1974, the conflict was transformed into Soviet and Chinese backed factional
fighting. The Soviets supported the MPLA while China backed both the
FLNA and UNITA.62 The MPLA seemingly triumphed in February, 1976, and
made attempts to push into Zaire. Assessing the apparent failure of its
Chinese jousting in Angola, the Chinese leadership concluded that it was not
prepared at that juncture in time to challenge the Soviets in the military
arena. Thereafter China's arms transfers were insignificant and symbolic in
nature.63
The perceptual shifts in Chinese foreign policy during the seventies
were driven by an all-consuming preoccupation with challenging the Soviet
Union in Africa. China viewed Soviet imperialism as a threat to world peace.
This view of reality was the framework of Mao's formulation of the "Three
Worlds Theory" which was yet another form of the United Front strategy.
The strategy, in essence, found the interests of China, the U.S. and the Third
World and set them in opposition to the Soviet Union. Mao first articulated
the "Three Worlds Theory" to Kenneth Kaunda in 1974 and also stated "We
62 Snow, op. cit., p. 127.
63 Ibid.
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are the Third World."64 Mao was firm in his conviction that together they
could successfully oppose Soviet hegemony in the region.
Henceforth China "adopted a complementary approach toward Africa
and Third World issues" 65 and would stop at nothing to undermine Soviet
influence. This was true even in those cases where its actions conflicted with
its ideology and that of African nations. A prime example of which was
Chinese support for the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, pursued even though it
greatly irritated Arabs.66 However, Deng Xiaoping "assured Africans that
when China became an advanced nation" it would not abandon the Third
world. While the policy was effective for a time, it had run its course by the
time the 1980s approached. Thus, China abandoned its strategy and began to
distance itself from the U.S. The split was more complete when the Reagan
administration exhibited a more pro-Taiwanese stance than the Carter
administration.67
F. 1980-1989. POST MAO: THE ERA OF PRAGMATISM
After the death of Mao in 1976, China implemented a series of domestic
reforms which essentially disavowed most of the ideological concerns and
policies that had been associated with Mao for the last 20 years of his life. In
July 1981, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the
64 Snow, op. cit., p. 141.




,7 Harding, Harry, A Fragile Relationship, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1992),
I.
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Communist Party (CPC) an evaluation and verdict on its history since the
establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 was issued. While
the document praised the contributions of Mao it was also highly critical of
his policies, particularly the Cultural Revolution.68
Comrade Mao Zedong was a great Marxist and a great proletarian
revolutionary, strategist and theorist. It is true that he made gross
mistakes during the "cultural revolution," but, if we judge his activities
as a whole, his contributions to the Chinese revolution far outweigh his
mistakes. His merits are primary and his errors secondary. He rendered
indelible meritorious service in founding and building up our Party and
the Chinese People's Liberation Army, in winning victory for the cause
of liberation of the Chinese people, in founding the People's Republic of
China and in advancing our socialist cause. He made major
contributions to the liberation of the oppressed nations of the world and
to the progress of mankind.69
1982 not only marked the 27th anniversary of the Bandung Conference
_but also marked the establishment of a new direction in foreign policy
unveiled at the Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party (CPC), June 1981.
A Former CPC General Secretary stated that this signified the era of a new
"peaceful independent policy7' designed not only to open the door externally
but to stimulate new dynamism at home.70 Because Africa has always been at
the center of China's foreign policy the effect is three-fold:
• Peace and independence,
• The Four Principles, and
• Third World stance reevaluated.
68 Beijing Review, July 1981, p. 29.
69 Ibid.
70 Hu, Yaogang, "Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization,
Beijing Review, 13 September 1982, 29.
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1. Peace and Independence
By the end of 1982 Sino-American relations were markedly strained.
China was highly suspicious of the Reagan administration strengthening its
relations with Taiwan. In addition, China was aggravated by U.S. arms sales
to Taiwan. From the perspective of the PRC leadership, there was a clear
linkage between U.S. support of the Taiwanese military and the continuing
failure to get reunification talks with Taiwan underway. The level of
hostility was reduced when the Reagan administration, as a conciliatory
action, agreed to curtail future arms sales to Taiwan. 71 By the end of 1982,
China found it in its best interests to loosen its ties with the United States and
announced an independent foreign policy based upon the "Five Principles of
Coexistence." Moreover, former (CPC) Secretary Hu Yaobang proclaimed
"China never attaches itself to any big power or group of powers, and never
yields to pressure from any big power."72
This move towards neutrality was an attempt to refocus its foreign
policy and re-establish its stature and influence in the Third World, which
had been weakened by rapprochement with the U.S. Because Africa has
always been an integral part of China's foreign policy, Premier Zhao Ziyang,
like Zhou En Lai, embarked on a political /ideological tour to 11 African
nations lasting from December 1982 to January 1983. Included in the tour
were Egypt, Gabon, Algeria, Morocco, Kenya, Guinea, Zaire, Congo, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, and Tanzania. Zhao came to Africa with almost an identical
71 Harding, op. cit., p. 196.
72 Hu, op. cit, 1982, 29.
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theme to Zhou En Lai nearly 20 years ago. According to Zhao Ziyang, the
objective of this tour was to, "learn from African peoples' experiences in
construction, promote mutual understanding and friendship, strengthen
unity and cooperation between China and African countries." 73
While the objectives were almost identical, the intent and approach
differed. The theme throughout the tour was economic and technological
cooperation, African and Third World solidarity, South to South cooperation
and the importance of the role of the Organization of African Unity. (OAU).
While in Egypt, Zhao said:
The economic and technological cooperation between the two countries
has had a very good beginning. China will make efforts to further
develop this cooperation on the basis of the principles of equality and
mutual benefit, better practical results, more diversity in form and
mutual development .... He pointed out, "China's foreign policy is
consistent, with two basic points first oppose hegemonism and
safeguard world peace; and second, firmly unit and cooperate with the
other third world countries. This policy was reiterated at the 12th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China. The first countries
I visit after the 12th Party Congress are Egypt and other African countries.
This shows that China will further carry out the policy of firmly
strengthening its unity and co-operation with the other third world
countries, as was reiterated at the 12th Party Congress . . . Organization of
African Unity has made contributions to safeguarding the solidarity of
African and Third World countries. 74




"Premier Zhao Visits 10 African Countries," Beijing Review, 3 January, 1983, p. 6.
74 Ibid and "Premier Zhao visits Algeria and Morocco," Beijing Review, 10 January 1983, p.
For a full account of the trip to individual countries, see Beijing Review, 6-24 January 1983.
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In 1983, China established diplomatic relations with Angola. In 1985
China stepped up the level of economic aid to Ethiopia in the form of 15,000
tons of food, 75,000 agricultural tools, and 10,000 blankets. In 1986 leaders
from the ANC visited Beijing which resulted in a commitment of material
aid.75
China's actions were indicative of an ideological metamorphosis
from the stage of revolutionary struggle to that of economic development
and cooperation. In order to pursue economic development, China needed a
peaceful and stable environment. Within this context China vowed never to
involve itself within the internal affairs of African nations (South Africa
excluded) and since 1983 has generally maintained its policy of non-
intervention.
2. Emergence of Four Principles
On Zhou En-Lai's visit to African in 1963-1964, the "Eight Principles
Governing Chinese Foreign Aid"76 were implemented and policy. The "eight
75 Xuetong, Yan, "Sino-African Relations in the 1990s," CSIS Africa Notes, 19 April 1988,
p. 3.
7677ie Eight Principles Governing Red Chinese Foreign Aid are:
1. In the assistance it furnishes to other countries, the Chinese government constantly
observes the principle of equaltiy and mutual benefit. It never considers this assistance as
a type of unilateral charity but rather as mutual aid. Thanks to this assistance, friendly
and newly independent countries can progressively develop their national economies, free
themselves from colonial control, and consolidate world anti-imperialist forces.
2. In furnishng aid to omer countries, the Chinese government strictly respects the sovereignty
of the recipient states. It never asks for any privilege and never poses conditions.
3. The Chinese government furnishes it economic assistance in the form of loans exempt from
interest or at a minimum rate of interest and provides long periods for their repayment, so
as to reduce to a minimum the burden carried by the recipient countries.
4. In furnishing economic aid to foreign countries, the Chinese government does not seek to
place the recipients in a state of dependency on China but rather to aid them to move
forward, step by step, on the pathway of self-sufficiency.
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principles" were essentially a set of ideological guidelines to establish the
goals and criteria for loans and aid that China intended as assistance to
African nations in becoming self-sufficient. Almost 20 years later the Eight
Principles 77 were supplemented by Four Principles Governing Sino-African
Economic and Technological Cooperations78 . Marked ideological differences
5. Projects that the Chinese government helps the recipient countries to realize are, as much
as possible, those capable of yielding rapid results for a minimum investment. This makes
it possible for the recipient governments to increase their revenue and accumulate capital.
6. The Chinese government furnishes the best material manufactured by its own plants at
prices prevalent on the international markets. If the material provides not to be in
conformance with the norms and the quality desired, it promises to replace it.
7. To be sure that personnel of the recipient country has fully assimilated the necessary
knowledge to use its technical aid, the Chinese government offers it the appropriate
professional training.
8. The experts that the Chinese government sends to recipient countries to aid them in their
tasks of construction have the same standard of living as the experts of these countries.
Chines experts are forbidden to formulate any special demands or to benefit from special
advantages. From Cooley Appendix B, pp. 224-225.
^Xuetong, op. tit., p. 3.
78The following are the Four Principles Governing Sino-African Economic and Technical
Cooperation:
1. In carrying out economic and technological cooperation with African countries, China
abides by the principles of unity and friendship, equality and mutual benefit, respects their
sovereignty, does not interfere in their internal affairs, attaches no political conditions and
asks for no privileges whatsoever.
2. In China's economic and technological cooperation with African countries, full play will be
given to the strong points and potentials of both sides on the basis of their actual needs and
possibilities, and efforts will be made to achieve good economic results with less
investment, shorter construction cycles and quicker returns.
3. China's economic and technological cooperation with African countries takes a variety of
forms suited to the local specific conditions, such as offering technical services, training
technical and management personnel, engaging in scientific and technological exchanges,
undertaking construction projects, and entering into cooperative production and joint
ventures. With regard to the cooperative projects it undertakes, the Chinese side will see
to it that the signed contracts are observed, the quality of work guaranteed and stress laid
on friendship. The experts and technical personnel dispatched by the Chinese side do not
ask for special treatment.
4. The purpose of China's economic and technological cooperation with AFrican countries is to
contribute to the enhancement of the self-reliant capabilities of both sides and promote the
growth of the respective national economies by complementing and helping each other.
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between the policies are apparent. The Four Principles emphasized economic
and technological cooperation based on mutual benefit. 79
China has always confronted inadequate financial resources in
implementing its foreign policy. The change of focus was intended as a
solution to the monetary strain that its aid program had created. Since 1983,
talks with African nations have centered primarily on economic cooperation
development and mutual benefit. In 1986, China signed approximately $480
million in construction and labor contracts as well as initiated trade and
technology exchange committees with Tunisia, Mauritius, Gabon, Zaire,
Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mauritania, Algeria, and Libya.80
3. Third World Position .
Although China is a developing nation itself, it has attempted to
provide leadership and economic aid to African nations. During this period
aid to African nations increased from $50 million in 1983 to $400 million in
1987. Of course, there have been tradeoffs, not the least of which is a $350
million trade imbalance in favor of China. Nevertheless China has been
successful in implementing its model of economic reform; all the while
criticizing its nemeses, the United States and the Soviet Union, for meddling
in the internal affairs of Africa. What makes the Chinese economic model so
attractive for some African nations is that it provides much needed assistance
while still allowing the measure of political and economic independence that
African nations consider a necessity.
79Xuetong, op. cit., p. 3.
^Xuetong, op. cit., p. 4
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The bottom line is that some African nations may identify with
China because, "similar to them, they are developing nations and unlike
them, China has real potential to be an authentic global power and perhaps
someday defend Africa's interest."
C SUMMARY
Since 1949, China's foreign policy has evolved from one based on
revolutionary ideology and armed conflict to the more pragmatic stance of
peaceful coexistence and economic reform. China's primary objective and
ambition has been to gain influence, respect and international political
support.
Although China has forged relations with other developing/Third World
nations in Latin America and Asia, ideological differences, strategic
considerations and the issue of Taiwan have served as natural barriers to
graining prestige and spreading its influence. Thus, Africa became the sole
venue by which China could successfully compete with the super powers on a
level playing field.
China's role and activities can, and have often been, perceived as that of
an agitator pursuing an agenda of world revolution. The most difficult aspect
of analyzing Chinese foreign policy to this point has involved the task of
deciphering the rhetorical content from the real purpose. One element of the
analytical task is clear, however, the heart and thrust of China's foreign policy
has been its African ambitions.
China has been successful in many of its initiatives and ventures. While
it can also be noted that numerous ventures failed and failed miserably.
47
There are several reasons for the most notable failures. First, China's
successes and failures in foreign policy have been directly correlated with its
domestic policies. A primary example was the "Great Proletarian
Revolution" in that it sent out an ill-conceived message that China did not
practice what it preached.
Second, China has consistently overestimated the blanket support
revolutionary ideology would receive in the African states. The fact of the
matter is that most African nations have always been wary of China's
motives and intentions.
Third and most important, Zhou was not sufficiently versed in the
diversity among the African states. As a result, China did not take the
variations of cultural realities and political aims into account while seeking
to establish extremely broad-based political and economic alliances. This
naivete was evident when Zhou En Lai stated during the 1960s
"Revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout the African continent."
Varying sets of priorities and objectives among diverse sectors of the African
population made it almost impossible for China to set a consistent policy. As
a result China resorted to implementing policy, on an ad hoc basis,
supporting those regions and /or elements that exhibited characteristics
favorable, in at least some degree, to China's ideology.
As has been seen, the 1970s witnessed a perceptual change at the base of
Chinese foreign policy. As China emerged from the Great Proletarian
Revolution, its objectives in Africa, as elsewhere, became focused on the
pragmatic and less revolutionary and rhetorical. Its earlier practices of
supporting revolutionary bands and subversive activities had failed
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miserably. After failing to achieve influence by revolutionary means and
given the challenges of a new international environment (in particular the
Sino-Soviet conflict), China developed a policy that was much more flexible.
Influence was attained through the orthodox method of bilateral trade, and
economic agreements. The change in tactics resulted in wide-scale African
support which was not only instrumental in China's attainment of its U.N.
seat but also assured unequivocal African support on many U.N. matters.
In the 1980s, China again underwent a foreign policy metamorphosis
exemplified by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and Four
Principles of Economic and Technical Cooperation. Domestically, China's
focus had been on far-reaching economic reformation. The change in
ideological tilt was transposed to the international sector. When nearly half
of Africa's heads of state visited Beijing, the biggest challenge was to bring
these countries into the stream of economic reform.
At the end of the 1980s, entering the 90s, China was faced with the
international repercussions of the Tianamen Square incident, the cessation of
the Cold War and the Gulf War. As self-proclaimed leader of the Third
World, China's rhetoric was obliged to change. Thus South-to-South
cooperation as well as economic reform had to be encouraged. The "new
world order," or extension of capitalist free trade into previously socialist
domains, would expose a greater need for capital for Third World
development than China could provide. The emphasis that China is
currently placing on building a Third World trade infrastructure for those
nations who are excluded from development because of capital shortage is
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both an opportunity and potentially the boldest bid that China has yet made
in terms of constructing a vast and cohesive network of friendly nations.
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III. CONTEMPORARY SINO-AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY
This chapter examines contemporary Sino-African relations from 1990 to
the present. These events have brought about dramatic changes in the
international environment and may have far-reaching consequences for
China as well as Africa. Of particular importance are 1) the ending of the Cold
War, 2) the effect of the American victory in the Gulf War, 3) the American
perception of the New World Order, and 4) renewed intensification in the
North-South conflict.
A. THE EFFECTS OF THE ENDING COLD WAR ON SINO-AFRICAN
RELATIONS
The ending of the Cold war has had a tremendous effect on Africa and
Sino-African relations. With the ending of the Cold War African nations
"felt marginalized by industrialized nations and has produced a post-colonial
identity crisis for a continent long regarded as strategic'' 81 in the high stakes
struggle between the superpowers. In addition, Africa's relationship with
China was also undergoing a metamorphosis of sorts. China, facing
international condemnation and economic sanctions as a result of the
Tiananmen Square incident, had been forced to decrease the level of aid to
African states. China's priority has been to husband its capital resources in an
effort to keep its domestic economic agenda on track in the aftermath of the
Tianamen incident. With the exception of loan /aid packages extended to the
81
"The Gulf Crisis: Is This The Third World's War?"Africa Report, March-April 1991, 5-
8.
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Central African Republic, Algeria and Ethiopia and the restructuring of
Zaire's debt,82 Chinese aid has become conspicuously absent following
Tiananmen.
In essence there is a feeling of Africa "fatigue" in the international
community. No longer an appropriate playing field for superpower
surrogates, African has essentially been told to "Get your house in order. No
longer a priority." African states can no longer expect to receive substantial
financial or technical assistance from the West. Michael Chege (a Kenyan
political scientist) for the Ford Foundation writes:
With the ending of the Cold War, African has lost whatever political
luster it may have once had, and there are no compelling geostrategic or
economic reasons to catapult it to the top of the global agenda.83
B. THE EFFECTS OF THE GULF WAR ON SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS
This may be changing. The Gulf War sent an uneasy message to China
and African States. The willingness of the Western Powers to aggregate their
military force and President George Bush's vision of "New World Order" is
being viewed with fear and skepticism by China and the African States who
see it as simply another face of neocolonialism. 84 The overwhelming
majority of Third World nations share a common history of colonial
exploitation. The significance of the Gulf War, when viewed from such a
vantage, was not the containment of Iraqi aggression, but rather a full-scale
82Segal, op. cit. p. 124-125.
83Chege, M., "Remembering Africa," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, no. 1, Winter, 1992, p. 156.
84Segal, op. cit. p. 124-125.
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cooperative effort on the part of the industrialized powers to protect western
interest in what is still essentially a Western economic sphere of influence.
The fact that virtually all the western nations and Japan participated in
financing the Gulf War was seen as a testament to the economic
interdependence of the Western economies and as a grim omen in regard to
the willingness of the industrialized powers to protect their position of
economic advantage and "right" to the resources of the world.
African states also fear that they will be left to perpetual economic ruin as
what few capital resources that are available are redirected to the former
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, thereby further stifling their own
aspirations and development strategies.85
China recognizes the implications of the ever-shrinking pool of
development capital and has called for greater South to South cooperation as
the economic gap between North and South, rich vs. poor intensifies. Li Peng
(Premier of the State Council) stated at the 5th session of the 7th National
Peoples Congress on 20 March 1992:
International economic competition is growing bitter. Contradictions
between North and South are becoming more pronounced .... Another
key element if our foreign policy is to strengthen solidarity and
cooperation between China and other developing countries in Asia,
Africa and Latin America and our friendship and cooperation have been
increasingly fruitful. The Chinese government supports the just
struggle of South African people." 86
^Versi, Anver, "1991 and All That," New African, Jan. 1992.
^"Report on the Work of the Government. 5th Session of the Seventh National Peoples
Congress on 20 March 1992," Beijing Review, April 13-19, 1992, p. I-XVI.
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In China's view power politics and world hegemony is at an all-time high
as "Western countries exert economic pressure on the Third World by
linking their assistance with democracy and human rights." 87 Africa is a
classic example and having abandoned the hopes of the 60s and 70s is now
struggling for sheer survival.
The 1980s are known as the "lost decade for Africa" as its economy
deteriorated and the number of severely underdeveloped countries rose from
16 to 28 between 1980 and 1989.88 During the same period GDP stagnated and
the economic growth rate dropped from 3.4% to -1.5% the resource balance
declined as a percentage of GDP declined from 1.4% to -3.3%. The average
annual growth rate further declined from -3.5% to -4.5%. In fact, Africa was
the only region in the world not to experience per capital growth.89 The
percentage of African contribution to World Gross Product declined from
1.9% to 1.2%. In addition, Africa is still faced with an external debt that grew
to approximately $270 billion. 40% of Africa's export earnings are used to
repay interest on that debt approximates $500 million /year. All this while
population growth has expanded at a rate of 3%, three times greater than the
rate at which agricultural land is being put into production in order to feed
the expanding population.90
87Ren, Sa, Beijing Review, "Third World Challenges and Opportunities," p. 12.
88Zongde, Chen., "The Difficulties Confronting AFrican Economic Adjustment in the
1990s." in Contemporary African Economic and Political Development (The Second Sino-U.S.
African Studies Conference) p. 67.
89Ibid.
90Yongmin Pan, "OAU Urges Pool Efforts," Beijing Review, June 24-30, 1991, p. 12.
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Moreover, from the period 1990 to present, more than half the African
states have been mired in political, national, factional and territorial strife
that have continued to cripple the economy. As a result the following leaders
have fallen from power. (See Table 8.)
TABLE 8. FALLEN HEADS OF STATE
Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia) Voted out October 1991
Kengistu Haile Mariam (Ethiopia) Fled 21 May 1991
Metsing Lekhanya (Lesotho) Toppled 30 April 1991
Mouissa Traore (Mali) Toppled 25 March 1991
Mathieu Kerkou (Benin) Voted out 25 March 1991
Aristides Pereira (Cape Verde) Voted out 17 February 1991
Siyad Barre (Somalia) Fled 27 January 1991
Pinto Da Costa (Sao Tome) Voted out 20 January 1991
Hissene Habre (Chad) Fled 2 December 1991
Samuel Doe (Liberia) Murdered 10 September 1990
Chadli Benedid (Algeria) Replaced June 1990
Sam Nujoma (Namibia) Replaced June 1990
Source: Compiled by author from New Africa, July 1991 and Riley S.
"Democratic Transition in Africa," Conflict Studies, 1991, p. 27.
These challenges have forced African nations to seek new alternatives in
development. Consequently several OAU, African Leadership Forum
conferences have been convened to discuss problems, solutions, and set
agendas for progress. In addition, African nations signed an agreement to
develop an African Economic Community to promote economic integration
and development.91
91 Ibid., p. 13.
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These developments have met with tacit approval in China as positive
steps towards strengthening the economic position of the Third World.
If Third World nations strive to develop their national economies,
strengthen South to South Cooperation, speed up North-South
Dialogue, they will become a force in the international arena in the 1990s
and a vital part of the world's effort to set up a new international
Political and Economic Order.92
China is fully aware that Africa supplies a significant proportion of the
world's raw materials to industrialized nations, particularly Europe and
Japan.93 Because many of these African nations depend on these materials for
their present economic survival and as the source of future investment
capital, receiving fair market value is of great importance. Although African
minerals play a fundamental role in the economic prosperity of the
developed nations, there is insufficient direct investment back into African
economies. The perception of a structural inequity in the trade practices
currently and historically emplaced are fueling a pan-African consensus for
demanding fairer trade policies. If a successful United Front is maintained,
the industrialized nations will be forced to restructure trade agreements and
practices. China realizes that only economic issues can get a North-South
92B«/z'ng Review, op. rib, p. 12.
93Gerard Chaliand, "The Struggle for Africa" (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 32-
33. Percentage of raw materials are as follows: Diamonds (75%), gold (70%), cobalt (70%),
vanadium (50%), platinum (46%), chrome (36%), mananese (30%), copper (20%), uranium
(20%). Materials are mostly concentrated in the following areas: South Africa, Namibia,
Angola, Zambia, Zaire, the Maghreb, Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria
and Libya are rich in hydrocarbons, phosphates, iron and uranium.
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dialogue started and that ultimately the issue of peaceful coexistence is
dependent upon mutually beneficial economic interaction.94
C CHINA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER
The concept of a New World Order manipulated at the behest of the
western powers is offensive to the Chinese leadership. The prospect of the
Western Powers colluding to formulate an international order articulated by
President George Bush "where diverse nations are drawn together in a
common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and
security, freedom and the rule of law. ... America was the only nation on this
earth that could assemble the forces of peace"95 is threatening to China, which
views it as a manifestation of neocolonialism.96
China hopes to foster the development of an entirely different type of
"New World Order." As early as 1988, Deng Xiaoping stated:
I recommend that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which was
formulated by us Asians in the 1950s should serve as the norms for the
new international order for a very long period of time.97
China views these principles as the norms that should guide future
international relations to attain peace and development. The Five Principles
are as follows:
94Xu, Op. tit., p. 14.
95Tucker, Robert and David Henderson, "The Imperial Temptation: The New World
Order and American Purpose," (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1972), p. 30.
96Segal. op.cit., p. 124-125.
97Zhenhuang, op. tit., p. 12.
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Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty
Mutual nonaggression
Noninterference in each others' internal affairs
Equality and mutual benefit
Peaceful coexistence.
China vehemently rejects the concept of the New World Order as
formulated by President George Bush. China's perception is that it is a "New
World Order" dominated by a tripolar U.S.-Western Europe-Japan coalition
which supports U.S. hegemonic aspirations and uses democratization and the
human rights issue as a condition for economic cooperation.98 China
maintains that a viable New World Order should take the needs and interests
of all the nations in the world into consideration and that it should not be
based on power politics and the continued exploitation of the developing
nations of the "Third World." Thus a "fair and rational new international
order in which all nations, big or small, will participate" should be the aim."
Li Peng at the UN Security Summit in January 1992 stated:
... in our view, such basic principles as sovereign equality of member
states and noninterference in their internal affairs ... should be observed
by all its members without exception. All countries, big, small, weak,
rich or poor, are entitled to participate in world affairs as equal members
of the community and make their own contributions toward peace and
development. 100
98Jiron, Zhou "Transitional World Structure of the 1990s and its Impact on the
Establishment of the New International Order." China Institute of Contemporary International
Relations, October 1991.
"Ibid., p. 5.
l°°"Li Peng Addresses Summit," full text of speech by Li Peng at UN Security Sumit, 31
January 1992, FBIS 3 February 1992 from RENMIN RIBAO OVERSEAS EDITION.
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In an interview Li Peng went on to say:
China believes the future new international political and economic
order should be based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It
would be dangerous for one or several countries to lead the world. We
consider that all countries, big or small, rich or poor, and strong or weak,
are equal members of the world family, should enjoy equal rights to
peace and development of the world and should fulfill their own duties.
We also consider that the United Nations should play a greater role in
the future new international order. 101
1. Diplomatic Offensive
China has undertaken a pragmatic diplomatic offensive seeking to
parlay its primacy in the Third World and veto power in the United Nations
into a position where it can take a significant role in shaping this "New
World Order." Of the 165 members of the United Nations 130 are deemed to
be developing nations. This may well explain why China favors an increased
role for the UN in defining the nature and working structure of the New
World Order. The Tiananmen Square incident left China in virtual isolation
and as a result went from being pursued as a trade partner to being a pursuer.
China's present objective is to establish a network of trade partners that will
eventually alleviate dependence on U.S. markets and /or goodwill for
achieving their economic goals.
In a six-month period (July 1991 through January 1992) Chinese
Premier Li Peng visited six Middle Eastern nations (Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Syria and Kuwait). In January 1992, Foreign minister Qian Qichen
visited six subsaharan African nations (Mali, Guinea, Senegal, Ivory Coast,
101 Li Peng, "Li Peng on Domestic and World Issues," interview by Mario Vasquez, Beijing
Review, July 1991, p. 27.
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Ghana, and Namibia, including a stopover in South Africa), and established
diplomatic ties with Israel. 102 In addition Li Peng also visited members of the
EC (Italy, Switzerland, Portugal and Spain.)
The primary objective of Li Peng's diplomatic initiative was to rebuff
what he views as the advance of U.S. hegemony by rallying support for a
"New World Order" based on the Five Principles and South to South
cooperation. 103 Chinese leaders also centered discussions around the
international economic situation and debt burdens which are completely
crippling the developing nations thereby widening the gap between North
and South nations. "They believe that the unreasonable situation must be
changed as soon as possible. For this purpose, the South to South cooperation
must first be strengthened to realize effective dialogues between the South
and the North."104 In China's view what is needed is a broad united front
economic strategy designed to challenge the economic supremacy of the
North. China feels that it has consolidated its position, having stood its
ground after Tianamen and world isolation. In an effort at least partly
motivated by the desire to project a more progressive world image, China has
enhanced its global acceptance by participating in the peace settlements in
Cambodia and Namibia. Now China is accelerating its evolution toward
political moderation by using its diplomatic influence to pursue its primary
102Xiadong, Zhang, 'Time to End Middle Instability," Beijing Review, 22 July 1991, pp. 13-
14 and "Qian Winds up African Tour," Beijing Review, 3-16 February 1992, p. 8 and FB/S-CHI-
92-013, 21 January 1992, pp. 17-20.
103 Ibid.
104Xiaodong, opcit, p. 14.
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objective of strengthening its domestic economy. Improving trade,
developing new markets, luring foreign investment and technology
transference are the top priorities of China's trade and foreign policies.
China is also seeking support for observer status in the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) as well as reentry into GATT. China also hopes to play an
expanded role as arbiter of international affairs and peaceful conflict
resolution.
2. Arms Sales
The issue of China's proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic
missile technology to Third world nations is a source of contention between
China and the West. China has emerged as the third largest exporter of arms
after the United States and the former Soviet Union.105 China's emergence as
a major arms exporter coincides with the U.S. exchange of high technology to
Beijing. While the United States was selling sophisticated weaponry to
China, China became the primary supplier of sophisticated weaponry at
bargain basement prices to the Third World. Beijing relies heavily on its
arms sales to support its own arms industry, develop new weaponry and gain
influence in those regions. 106
The most significant commerce involves sales of ballistic missiles to
Saudi Arabia ($2-3 billion), Mil missiles to Pakistan, M9 missiles to Syria and
105Pear, Robert, "U.S. Ranked No. 1 in Weapons Sales," New York Times, 10 August 1991,
p. 10.
106 Marie, Gottschalk, "The Failure of American Policy," World Policy Journal, 4 (Fall
1989), p. 6670.
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a 15 megawatt nuclear reactor to Algeria. 107 Attempts to curb missile
proliferation have failed despite the fact China has declared its willingness to
sign the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) "in principle" and entertain the
possibility of joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 108
Moreover, China is modernizing its military machine, seeking to construct a
military capable of projecting power far beyond the adjacent geography.
Emphasis has been placed on developing or buying air refueling capability
and expanding its Navy, with plans for building an aircraft carrier. In
addition China has increased its long-range deployments and exercises. This
military buildup should make China a formidable regional force in the near
future.109
China resents the pressure tactics and patronizing attitude of the
United States represented by linkage of arms sales and human rights issues
with renewal of Most Favored Nation status. President Yang Shankun in an
interview with U.S. News and World Report stated:
American opinion censures us for selling weapons. Yet why does it not
censure itself? Many of the weapons in the Middle East are American.
So there is a question of fairness here ... China has a saying, "only
magistrates are allowed to set fires. Ordinary people are not allowed to
light lights ... so we ask Americans to understand the Chinese peoples'
frame of mine. China has a psychology that is very important. The
more pressure you apply, the less China will give in. If you speak
107Sheryl WuDunn, "China Backs Pact on Nuclear Arms," New York Times, 11 August
1991, p. Al, Nicholas D. Kristoff, "Potent Office Weaves Web in China's Arms/' New York
Times, 21 August 1991, p. A4 and Susan Lawrence, "Inside Beijing's Arms Bazaar," U.S. News
and World Report, 22 July 1991, pp. 37-38.
*°8lbid.
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reasonably, if you explain your reasons clearly, China might agree. If you
resort to high pressure, however, it will be counterproductive. 110
The often sanctimonious rhetoric of the U.S. is particularly
aggravating to China and the Third World in light of the fact that the severe
economic deterioration the Third World experienced during the last decade
directly coincides with the growth in U.S. debt, which grew from $1 trillion to
$4 trillion in the same decade, effectively absorbing much development
capital that would otherwise have been available to underdeveloped nations.
Faced with paucity of hard capital China will continue to export arms
as a means of meeting strategic and political objectives: gaining influence,
recognition as the unequivocal and true leader of the Third World and a
legitimate global power. The underground nuclear detonation that took place
in China in May of 1992 is further evidence that the Chinese leadership
regards the present as a time for self-assertion and is far more concerned with
establishing China's military credibility than with the consequences or
censure of American opinion.
D. SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS AND NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT SINCE
1990
The motif most frequently articulated by China is the need for increased
North-South dialogue, South to South cooperation and a New World Order
109 Kristoff, "China Looks at World Order," New York Times, p. Al Tai Meng Cheung,
"Defense: Counter Marketing," Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 August 1991, p. 30-31.
1
^President Yang Shankung, interviewed by Mortimer Auckerman in U.S. News and
World Report: The U.S. Also Sells Weapons, 27 May 1991, p. 43.
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that encompasses "both political and economic aspects." 111 The North-South
dialogue is the brainchild of the Group of 77. In 1974 the United Nations
adopted the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order. 111 Its intent was to negotiate "changes in the global
economic system in order to make it more equitable and more supportive of
development" 113 in Third World nations. The prospects for a meaningful
North-South dialogue gained momentum in the period 1974-1979 as a result
of the oil crisis in 1973. The South Commission reports:
It was undoubtedly spurred by the fear of the developed countries that
the newly found assertiveness of the South after the rise of oil prices
could lead to a damaging confrontation.114
At the time the South has some leverage with which to negotiate. Once
the leverage disappeared, the northern developed nations abruptly lost
interest in the ways they might assist economic development in the southern
nations.
In effect meaningful North-South negotiations ended at the conference
(UNCTAD) in Manila ... By that time there had been an ideological shift
in the governments of some leading countries of the North. In addition
the governments of most of the countries of the North had become
preoccupied with fighting inflation at home, and gave no priority to
in Xu, Han, "New World Order: A Chinese Perspective," Beijing Review, Sep. 9-15 1991,
Pp. 31-34, and Li, Luye, "UN Role in Establishing a New World Order," Beijing Review, 30
September to 6 October 1991, pp. 12-16.
112Ibid.
113 C/ia//enge to the South. The Report of the South Commission,, London: Oxford
University Press, 1990, p. 217.
114Ibid., p. 217.
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agreeing on a new basis for North-South economic relations or to
defining the nature, scope and prospects of interdependence. 115
Many of the countries in the South (Third World) suffer from a
multitude of problems. What the vast majority of the nations of the
southern hemisphere have in common is endemic structural poverty that is
the direct result of inadequate capitalization and an absence of the type of
investment that has wide-spread ramifications and long-term benefits, i.e.,
reinvestment of profit in local economies that would serve as the basis of
capital dispersion and formation. As nations in the North gravitated to high-
tech industrialization and stockpiling, the need for raw materials declined by
one-third and severely damaged those few Southern economies that had
finally gained autonomy over their own resources. Moreover, the high debt
accrued by Third World nations, particularly in Africa, preclude sustained
economic development. More than 40% of Africa's annual export earnings
are used to service its foreign debt. 116
At the first North-South Roundtable Conference held in Abidjan 8-9 July
1991, Jean Pierre Bouder, Executive Director of the World Bank said that
"developing countries had paid to the North more than it was receiving in
loans, grants or investments." 117 The Chinese leadership maintains that such
imbalances are the "root cause" of social instability in the South and will
ultimately lead to armed conflict. "In the absence of economic development
^^Challenge to the South, op. cit., p. 217.
116Dzisah Melvis, "Reduce Our Debt," New African, October 1991, p. 31.
u7lbid.
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there will be no genuine peace and stability in the world." 118 China rejects the
explanation that poverty in Africa is a direct result of African failure to
practice democracy and embrace capitalist ideals, asserting rather that the
major problem is the exploitation and unfair trade practices employed by the
North. 119 Li Peng, in speaking on the issue of global North-South conflict has
stated "developed countries should do more and take on more responsibility
for narrowing the gap, adopt a more tolerant attitude towards debt, practice
exchange of equal values in trade and attach no political strings.120
On 8 July 1991 Chairman of the South Commission and ex-President of
Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, was in China and presented Li Peng with the
Chinese edition of Challenge to the South. The report was a culmination of
three years work by the South Commission (formed in 1987) to which China
donated $400,000. The report is a comprehensive review and analysis of the
development and underdevelopment of countries in the Southern
hemisphere. The commission emphasizes the need for Third world nations
to intensity their struggle for self-reliance, social justice and solidarity among
themselves. The report notes that "despite its great promise and natural
resources the Third World has not benefitted from world prosperity." 121
Despite the developing world's technological progress and vast proliferation
118Luye, Li, "UN Role in Establishing a New World Order," Beijing Review, September 30
to 6 October 1991, p. 13. Li Luy is the Director-General of the China Cneter for International
Studies and has been China's personal representative for the United Nations.
119Ibid., p. 14.
120Li Peng, op.cit., July 1991, p. 27.
^Challenge to the South, op. tit, p. 218.
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of consumer goods, 75% of the world's population (.35 billion are living at or
below minimum human subsistence."
The report also addresses the cause of underdevelopment, inadequate
economic infrastructure and lack of education being primary among them.
The report is critical of economic and financial arrangements that were clearly
designed to foster the interests of the developed countries at the expense of
the Third World.
Carrying the theme of inequity on to its logical conclusion, the report
advocates the formation of an alliance between the least developed countries
and would declare and end to debt repayment within the present terms
thereby the developed nations to renegotiate the terms of the debts. The
point raised in Challenge to the South reinforce the ideology and rhetoric that
China has long been exposed to concerning the Third World. Now it seems
the Third World has embraced it and is now ready to make changes.
E NEW CHINESE LEADERSHIP
There is much speculation as to what the effect of a change in leadership
will have on the implementation of its foreign policy. The logical guess is
.very little. Regardless of who ascends to power the emphasis will continue to
be on economic reform. As Harry Harding said in, The Fragile Relationship
The most important development to occur in China in the 1980's was
the program of economic reform and international engagement ....
Rooted in the realization that China could not become a modern
powerful nation let alone keep up with the rest of Asia-Pacific
region.... 122
122Harding, Harry, The Fragile Relationship 1992, op. cit.,p. 335.
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China's challenge will be to press ahead with its own development. China is
leery to develop full economic interdependence with the U.S. and Japan.
Thus it will seek to establish access to markets in the Third World, including
Africa. The prospect of a Free South Africa is extremely appealing to both
China and Africa. Moreover as mentioned above, African nations have
agreed to regional economic integration. Clearly, Chinese diplomatic actions
are aimed at long-term rewards. As such, China will continue to perform in a
pragmatic fashion internationally in order to achieve its goal of wealth,
influence, prestige and most importantly, global power status. But it will
have to be within the limits of its own capabilities.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Historical judgment will undoubtedly single out the disintegration of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War as being the key events of the
previous decade. The Gulf War was looked upon as the herald of a "New
World Order." Ironically, however, another war perhaps even more
threatening to coexistence and world peace was initiated, though its
beginning went completely unnoticed. As of yet, it is a secret war of global
proportion, a war of capital deprivation between the Haves and Have Nots.
As with all wars, the root causes have long historical pedigree but the
precipitating event of the new Cold War was the monumental growth in U.S.
debt, the ramifications of which have driven the majority of underdeveloped
nations to the brink of desperation.
Viewed from the perspective of the Have Nots, the actions and policies of
the U.S. government in regard to the national debt have two possible
interpretations. The first is that the mechanisms of responsible government
inside the U.S. have simply broken down and the rest of the interdependent
industrial economies have had little choice but to underwrite the growing
deficits in order to protect their own investments and insure the continued
prosperity of the developed nations as a whole. A collapse of the American
economy would have disastrous effects throughout the developed and
developing world. A second, and more ominous interpretation is that the
developed nations, especially Japan and Germany, which are the primary
sources of American debt support, have been more than willing to funnel
their surplus investment capital into the U.S. treasury precisely because of the
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predictable effect it would have on Third World nations. Countries in the
grip of starvation and economic chaos have little leverage when haggling
over the price of their resources. 123 Whichever view one subscribes to makes
little difference, the fact remains that the prospect a "New World Order7'
wherein the developed nations employ military cooperation and economic
collusion as a means of gaining maximum and unchallenged advantage over
the Third World is quite literally life-threatening to the peoples of the
underdeveloped nations.
A world-wide shortage of capital and/or its inequitable distribution had
already become a global crisis before the disintegration of the Soviet Union
and its client states. The current efforts of the Eastern European and Central
Asian countries to develop capitalist economies can only have the effect of
greatly accelerating the economic decline of the underdeveloped nations. The
fact that industrial infrastructures exist in much of the former Soviet Union
and Eastern Bloc make them more competitive as receptacles for investment.
Geographic proximity and deep historical ties are also important factors in
their ability to attract capital at the expense of southern hemisphere
development.
Inasmuch as the decade of the 1980s witnessed the collapse of
"communism" inside the Soviet Union, it also bore witness to the failure of
"socialism and one-party rule" on the African subcontinent. Though no
alternative "ism" per se has yet been embraced by the African peoples, the
123Greenhouse, Steven, "U.S. and World: A New Economic Order is Ahead," New York
Times, 28 April 1992, Al.
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rhetoric and concept of South and South cooperation, as espoused and
formulated by the Chinese leadership, appears to be a logical and perhaps the
singular course of action available for many in the Third World as an
alternative to a new cycle of colonial rule and exploitation.
A. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERESTS IN AFRICA
For the last 40 years United States foreign policy towards Africa has been
defined within the strategic context of the East-West struggle. U.S. interest
was contingent on the perceived or real threat of its monolithic adversary, the
Soviet Union.
Priority was given to those nations which exhibited strategic value,
served strategic interests and were on the pro-Western side of the East-West
ideological struggle. The primary objective was to contain Soviet geostrategic
maneuvering. Africa did not figure into the overall scheme of Western
economic development strategy. Both overall direct U.S. investment and
exports to Africa hovered somewhere around three percent of U.S. total
international investment. However, Africa is a leading source of the world's
raw materials and mineral resources. Consequently the concerns of U.S.
policy makers focused on the vulnerability of strategic choke points which go
through the Indian Ocean and pass by the Cape of Good Hope to the Atlantic.
(See Figure 1) Virtually all of Europe's oil and a significant amount of U.S. oil
is transported through these shipping lanes. Blockage of these lanes would
result in economic hardship of vast proportions. The same is true for the




Figure 1. Map of Africa—Strategic Choke Points
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Red Sea and on to the Suez Canal. As a result of these concerns certain
"marriages of convenience" with a number of corrupt despots emerged.
Strategically important countries such as Kenya, South Africa, Somalia,
Sudan, Zaire, Mozambique, and Liberia embodied everything the U.S.
supposedly opposed, lack of democratic rule, repression, human rights
infractions, as well as plundering and mismanagement on the part of the
leadership. Yet the U.S. consistently ignored injustices to protect its interests
and those of its allies in the West.
As a result of competition between the Superpowers, regional conflicts
and internal struggles were magnified and masked within a Cold War
context. "The end of the Cold War," President Bush said in National Security
Strategy of the United States, "should benefit Africa in that it will no longer
be seen as a battle ground for superpower conflict. In a world of peace, more
attention and resources should be freed to help the world's poorest ....
Concepts of democracy and market economies must be applied in a continent
where initially these concepts were rejected because socialism was
fashionable ... Benign neglect will not suffice." 124
In contrast to Presidential and State Department rhetoric, the U.S. has
persisted in following a policy (with the exception of the South African
region) where Africa is low on the totem pole of priorities. Dictatorial rulers
such as Mobuto (Zaire), Barre (Somalia) and Mois (Kenya) whose
government were once propped up and were the recipients of substantial U.S.
aid have now been told to get their houses in order, make democratic reforms
^National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991, pp. 10-11.
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and/or step down. 125 To make matters worse, the national treasuries of a
number of the previously U.S.-backed countries have virtually been looted
with the full knowledge for the West. A prime example is Zaire whose ruler,
Mobuto, is alleged to have amassed a personal fortune worth $6 billion, half
the size of the national debt ($12 billion). 126 Africa is being seemingly
abandoned. If not for the pressure of the Congressional Black Caucus and the
TransAfrica lobby, Africa might possibly be deleted from the map of U.S.
concerns entirely.
In April, the U.S. advocated a sharp reduction in United Nations
Peacekeeping forces being deployed in wartorn Somalia. 127 In fact the "Horn
of Plenty is now the Horn of Misery/' Drought, famine and civil wars plague
the countries of Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, threatening
the lives of 23 million people. Central Africa is beset with epidemic AIDS and
has little to offer in medical facilities and treatment.
To the West, Nigeria, the continent's most prosperous state, is
experiencing social unrest as the result of religious conflict between Islamic
and Christian forces. Liberia has also experienced recent political unrest
which resulted in the death of Samuel Doe and substantial internal turmoil.
Western Sahara is mired in a factional war with Morocco. In North Africa,
Libya was just targeted with U.S.-sponsored sanctions. Southern Africa shows
125Noble, Kenneth B., "U.S. Reaping Zairians' Anger toward Mobuto," New York Times,
30 March 1992.
126Cowell, Alan. "Magic and Decay," New York Times Magazine, 5 April 1992, pp. 31-38.
127Perlez, Jane. "Stranded by Superpowers, Africa Seeks an Identity," New York Times, 17
May 1992, p. Al.
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the most promise of regional economic and social progress as a result of the
reforms recently instituted in Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia.
Despite the generally calamitous conditions, the U.S. needs to revamp its
foreign policy with regard to Africa. While it is true that Africa is a conflict-
prone region at this juncture in time, much of its conflict is a direct result of
its racist colonial past. When the European colonial powers withdrew from
their holdings no attempt was made to re-draw national boundaries that
would reflect the realities of cultural and historical bands and /or rivalries.
The newly independent states had little prospect of quickly becoming viable
homogeneous nations. As a consequence, what has arisen has been tribal
conflict and foreign-sponsored dictatorships. Nationalism became an obstacle
not a goal.128 Though independent from colonial rule, the legacy bequeathed
by the European powers has left Africa to suffer in disarray.
There are, however, some very real geopolitical and economic trends
beginning to develop that could have far-reaching consequences. In order to
be effective, the post-Cold War U.S. policy should be one based more on
genuine partnership for development and less on geopolitical and strategic
concerns. There is presently an opportunity for the United States to show
authentic leadership in world affairs that extends beyond the boundaries of
the industrialized nations and forge a relationship that is beneficial for both
128Ochola, Samuel Agonda, Minerals in African Underdevelopment, (London: Bogle-
L'Ouverture Publications Limited), 1975, p. 1-9.
European powers divided up the continent at the Berlin Conference in 1884-85. At this
time it was acquiesced that a European State could legally claim any territory that was
effectively occupied. Consequently, the divisions were instituted irregardless of tribal borders
which resulted in conflict, (i.e., indigenous Somalians live in four different states.)
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sides. Yet the opportunity may be proven to be evanescent. Michael Clough,
a former professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, and an Africanist at the
Council of Foreign Relations conveys some reasons why in his book, Free at
Last?
One reason is that the Bush Administration has failed to provide any
leadership on African Issues. Neither the President nor any of his senior
foreign advisers has displayed any real interest in the continent. Instead
they have delegated responsibility for policy toward Africa to mid-level
officials with limited vision and no domestic political base. These
officials operate with considerable latitude so long as they heed three
injunctions: 'Don't spend to much money. Don't take stands that might
create domestic controversies. Don't let African issues complicate policy
toward other, more important parts of the world.' 129
Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Reagan
Administration, Chester Crocker, supports this assessment. Speaking to
Africa Confidential he said, "Most secretaries of state have just wanted to
keep African issues off their desk ... the idea of putting big money into African
economic development remains an anathema." 130 Lacking any set of far-
reaching goals or policy objectives, the major theme of U.S. foreign policy has
been to use the carrot/ stick approach to promote increased democratization.
B. THE PUSH FOR DEMOCRACY
In 1990, the U.S. put its African friends on notice that all future aid would
be tied to democratic and human rights reforms. In speaking about
democracy at the African-American Institute, Assistant Secretary Cohen said
129Clough, op. cit., p. 2.
130
"USA/ Africa: Policy? What Policy?", Africa Confidential, Vol. 32, No. 1, 11 January
1991, p. 1.
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in 1991, "... We sincerely believe it is the only way that African people can
bring about happiness in the long run." 131
At an address at the Voice of America symposium, in September 1991 he
said,
Equally important, we are making clear the link between political
liberalization and outside assistance. We will help countries pursue a
democratic course and those already with democratic systems. In an era
of escalating demand for scarce sources, we cannot waste non-
humanitarian assistance on governments which refuse the path to
democracy.132
Even Julius Nyerere, elder statesman and former socialist president of
Tanzania, admits serious mistakes were made in Africa. At the African
Leadership Forum he told other African heads of state, 'The worst deficit we
have is the deficit of democracy. We thought we could develop without
involving the people." 133
African nations are ready to take full responsibility for themselves and
seek African solutions to African problems. Democratic electoral systems,
good governance, and a market economy are the desires of most African
peoples. But the reality is that being "democratic7' is unlikely to improve
their economic positions or living conditions. Acquiescing to U.S. demands
will not translate into increased aid but rather continuation or even decrease
of existing levels of U.S. aid. Simply put, the African states are going to have
131Cohen, Herman J., Africa and Democracy, U.S. Department of State, 2 December 1991,
Volume 2, No. 48, p. 871.
132Cohen, Herman J., Democratization in Africa, address before the Voice of America
Symposium, Washington, DC, September 17, 1991, U.S. Department of State Dispatch.
133Versi, Anver, "Back to the Future," New African, July 1991, p. 10.
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to run faster to remain in the same place. Democratic values and
commitments may be difficult to sustain in the face of growing western trade
protectionism, competition from newly industrialized states, a history of
authoritarian colonial and post-independence rule, in a context of continued
scarcity of resources and ethnic strife.134
C EFFECT OF CHINESE INITIATIVES ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
China will almost certainly emerge as a global power in the 21st Century.
As such, it could become a threat to American interests at some point in time.
At present China's consuming priority is to protect its national interest
through establishing stability, economic growth, and ''building socialism with
Chinese characteristics,"135
The Gulf and the Cold War have brought about a new set of relationships
for the entire world. While the industrialized nations are redefining
relations with African nations, China is doing the same. However, China is
taking an entirely different approach. The Chinese view this period as a
window of opportunity to gain friends and influence in the international
arena. China's objective is to create a mechanism of influence that extends
over the entire African continent.
Learning from their past experience, it is not China's objective to establish
relationships based on political ideology. Rather China seeks relationships
based on mutual economic benefit. China combines the pragmatic, visionary
134Riley, Stephen P., The Democratic Transition in Africa: An End to the One-party State,
p. 30.
135Li Peng, China's Foreign Relations, Beijing Review, 23-29, September 1991.
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and patient in its approach. Africa's potential for growth, strategic and raw
materials and the lure of new markets act as magnets for Chinese ambitions
for global expansion.
The goals of China's initiatives in Africa may ultimately be achieved for a
rather simple reason, and that is that the United States underestimates the
importance of China in Asia and pays too little attention to long-run
considerations. Rep. Les Aspin has even put China on the list of potential
conventional targets. The United States should show China more respect.
Just as "The Powers That Be" consistently underestimate the importance
of China in Asia, they likewise do the same in Africa. In fact in a draft of a
strategy document leaked to the New York Times, 8 March 1992 which
focused on regional contingencies and conflicts, neither China nor Africa was
mentioned.136 If even potential existed for regional conflict it will surely be in
this strategically vital part of the world. Besides the ever-present problem of
economic development, one of the greatest threats to the region is the
permeation of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the African continent. 137
(See Map #2). China, cognizant of the potential for conflict the Islamic issue
represents, has attempted to at least show tolerance by allowing Chinese
Muslims to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and opening its own mosques in
China.
136Tyler, Patrick E., "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," New York
Times, 8 March 1992, p. Al.
137Miller, Judith, "The Islamic Wave," New York Times Magazine, 31 May 1992, pp. 23-
43.
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Figure 2. Spread of Islamic Fundamentalism
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The fact that China no longer has to frame its dealings with African
nations in the context of the Cold War is of considerable benefit to Chinese
interests. Gone are the days of outright grants. Further aid is surely to be
based on mutual benefit and economic interdependence. Since Africa is, as
the director of the Inter Africa Group, Abdul Mohammed, expressed, "The
only region where you have B.C., A.D. and the Twenty-first Century" all in
one; 138 it is a perfect market for the export of low-level technology, that is
relatively simple to operate and maintain.
It may be somewhat misleading, however, to characterize the future of
Sino-African trade as being solely focused on the exchange of "low-level"
technology and equipment. The electronics and computer industries in
China are currently producing some products of sufficient quality to stand up
to open competition with Japanese and Western manufacturers. China is
somewhat unique in this regard, spanning the entire scale of technological
and industrial manufacture, which is also a very positive attribute in terms
of building trade with Africa.
The development of Sino-African trade need not pose any threat to the
interests of the United States. It would be advantageous, however, for the
U.S. to expand its trade with China as a means of curtailing an inordinate
dependence on building a defense industry as a primary mechanism of
employment, industrialization and trade. Roughly 70 percent of the Chinese
population is still rural and /or agrarian and living far below the standards
the Communist Party wants to achieve. The willingness of the gerontocracy
*38Perlez, op. cit., p. 9.
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to initiate the radical economic reforms of the last 10 years is ample
illustration of the risks the party is willing to take in order to accelerate
development and raise the standard of living. The manufacture and
proliferation of high-tech weaponry is too profitable for the Chinese to abstain
from but U.S. trade policy will undoubtedly be a crucial factor in determining
the scale of manufacture and the subsequent effects.
D. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
A final consideration in the development and interplay between Chinese
and American versions of the New World Order is the relative stature and
position support each can control and solidify in the U.N. China believes that
the U.N. should play a significant role in the implementation of the "New
World Order." China's diplomatic offensive and self*-proclamation as the de
facto leader of the 'Third World" is in great part designed to solidify Afro-
Asian/Third World bloc voting in the General Assembly which would then
have the capacity to undercut policies that are disadvantageous to its
coalition. Any issue strongly favored by the Assembly is almost certain to be
adopted, in spite of American opposition, as was the 1974 vote to expel South
Africa. 139 If the U.S. is going to conform to the United Nations as an
instrument and forum for the implementation of its policies, then it must
work to establish broad-based support that is inclusive of African and Chinese
interests.
139Luye, op cit., p. 121.
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China will likely emerge as a global power in the 21st Century. With
South to South Cooperation and relative apathy by the West towards African
in particular and Third World nations in general, China's economic
interaction with Third World countries will certainly grow. Within a
framework of economic interdependence Chinese influence in the region
will be greatly expanded, thereby challenging Western supremacy. Yes, Africa
has its share of problems but steps are being taken to alleviate and /or solve
them. Africans have read the handwriting on the wall. As they strive toward
regional solidarity and economic prosperity, the United States may find itself
on the outside of a formidable economic and political development that has
the ability to affect world agendas.
China on the other hand will have solidified its influence in one of the
most vitally strategic regions in the world and gained a venue to project the
power of its growing navy under the auspices of the Five Principles of
Coexistence. If South-to-South cooperation is successful and the result is a
more equitable distribution of wealth, they will have achieved their goal of
becoming a global power.
In light of these facts, this thesis will conclude with recommendations for
policies that I believe will be in the best interests of Africa, China and the
United States.
E RECOMMENDATIONS
1. What is in the Best Interest of Africa
After enduring a history of slavery, colonialism and oppression,
Africa is at a crossroads and must chart its own course and destiny. No longer
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a political or strategic interest to Western nations, African problems will have
to and should be solved amongst themselves. Thus the priority should be the
cessation of civil wars that are raging in such nations as Liberia, Sudan,
Ethiopia, and Angola. A more peaceful Africa will result in an economically
integrated Africa. An economically integrated Africa will result in a more
prosperous Africa.
Africa's move to democracy, dismantling of Apartheid, development
of the new African economic market and setting of agenda's to alleviate
poverty and stimulate growth are encouraging developments. Clearly, full
political/economic integration and interdependence will beneficial for the
entire region. As South African President de Klerk communicated on his
visit to several African nations in August 1991: "Trade not aid is the answer
to Africa's economic problems." With regional economic powerhouses such
as South Africa and Nigeria working in harmony, prospects for technological
medical and agricultural exchange and development should be promising.
This in turn would lead to self sufficiency. A more self-sufficient Africa
would become less of a burden to Western economies.
Economic prosperity combined with its influential voice in the
international forums could make Africa a force to be reckoned with. Africa
accounts for nearly 1/3 of UN votes (50) and has a tendency to vote in blocs
not only in the General Assembly but in other Third World organizations
such as the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), UNCTAD and the Group of 77.
This reality could impede or aid foreign policy initiatives of more powerful
northern states.
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Clearly the problems in Africa will not be solved over night but if it
remains poor, unstable, underdeveloped and undemocratic it may dissipate
into relative obscurity. The solution then becomes for Africa to pool its
resources and develop a united front. Africa must meet the .challenge to save t
itself because if they do not do it no one else will. ,- n
2. What is in the Best Interest of China? h
With the end of the Cold War and the implications of the Gulf War '
the strategic triangle (U.S.-China-Soviet) has dissipated. While the Chinese »•
government has publicly stated that cultivating improved relations with the
U.S. is of extreme importance, China has also made it clear that a healthy it
relationship is based on mutual respect, the five principles of coexistence and
the three joint communiques—the 1972 Shanghai communique, the 1979 o
Communique establishing diplomatic relations, and the 1982 Communique y
on Arms Sales to Taiwan. As Li Peng conveyed: : o
As long as the two sides strictly abide by the principles contained in their
three Joint Communiques the existing obstacles can be removed and
Sino-U.S. relations further improved. 140 ? A
Overall Chinese foreign policy is on the upbeat as an be seen by the
following facts. The Chinese have not modified their policies on arms sales,
human rights issues, and unfair trade practices and detonation of a nuclear
weapon, in spite of threatened retaliation. They have resumed friendly
relations with Japan, the states of the former Soviet Union and Israel, soon to
be followed by diplomatic relations with South Africa. China is also a full





participant in the Middle East Peace Conference and the Paris Peace Accord
(Cambodia), and still continues to enjoy Most Favored Nation status (MEN)
with the United States.
Clearly, China is looking to the Ttwenty-first Century with optimism.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and a peaceful environment, there is a
"window of opportunity7' to truly become the leader of the Third World,
perhaps fill the power gap and become a world power. With the political
support of Third World Nations, renewed South-to-South cooperation,
acceleration of the North-South economic gap, increased trade
interdependence and arms sales to various regions; China should be able to
achieve both strategic and political goals of becoming recognized as a world
power. Thus it is in China's best interest at this time to continue with
economic reform, pursue its independent foreign policy of peace and
contribute to the maintenance of a stable international environment.
3. What is in the Best Interests of the United States?
The Sino-African connection is a reality and prospects for economic
interdependence based on "cooperation and mutual benefits" may result in
far-reaching effects. Now that the Cold War is over the United States must
not forget Africa nor ignore the African challenges of debt, AIDS, refugees,
hunger, despots and human rights. Benign neglect, economic stagnation, and
heightened poverty may result in the reemergence and perpetuation of
despots.
Some African nations have proven thus far that they are willing to
move towards democracy and economic development. Although there is no
prospect of a Marshall Plan for all of Africa, the U.S. could help in the area of
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transference of technological and agricultural know-how to help bring about a
better way of life. More U.S. Aid ( hard cash) is not necessarily the answer.
Much of U.S. aid in the past consisted of machinery, arms and money that
conveniently found its way into the pockets of repressive despots. The "aid"
never reached or aided the people it was intended for—that being the
common person/peasant. I agree with Michael Clough who advocates
channeling subsequent aid through independent nongovernmental agencies.
Clough also calls for the mobilization of what he designates as "the third
sector" or those non- government organizations (NGO'S) interested in the
development of Africa. 141 It is imperative that the U.S. reconcile the needs of
Africa within the context of its own global interests. An effective manner in
which to achieve this is to utilize the knowledge and expertise of special
interest groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), the Ford
Foundation and TransAfrica. While there are other agencies involved in the
region, it is their efforts that effectively have influenced U.S foreign policy
towards Africa.
No two organizations have done more to effect change in Africa than
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and TransAfrica. From the time of CBC's
inception in 1971, it was clear that the scope of their concerns would include
foreign policy. TransAfrica an African-American lobby was formed in 1977
with an objective to form a progressive United States foreign policy towards
Africa in General and South Africa's Apartheid system in particular.
Together they were instrumental in garnering enough support to effectively
141Clough, op. cit., 119-120.
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override former President Reagan's veto of the Comprehensive Apartheid
Act of 1986. Clearly these sanctions were the strongest by any nation and were
responsible for the positive changes taken place in South Africa today. In
addition, the CBC has also spoken out against the repressive regimes and
Human Right violators in Liberia, Zaire and Ethiopia.
The Ford Foundation founded in 1913 is another non-profit
institution whose programs are international in scope. Moreover, the Ford
Foundation acts as an Transnational actor with the real ability to influence
foreign policy. 142 Its objective is to facilitate the causes of war and strengthen
the development of democracies in third World Nations particularly Africa
and Asia.
It is the Ford foundation that sponsors both African and Chinese
students at American Universities. In 1988, the Ford Foundation sponsored
the first U.S.-China African Studies conference in Beijing. 143 Since then the
US-African Studies Exchange Committee has been formed. George Yu writes:
With Africa as its intellectual focus the Committee has brought together
American and Chinese Africanist from universities and institutions in
the United States and China to discuss and examine topics of common
interest... Several levels of formal academic exchanges have been
conducted,including lecture visits to Chinese institutions by American
Africanist and research/study in the United States followed by field work
in Africa by Chinese Scholars. At least three parties benefit African,
Americans and Chinese. 144
142Bennett, A. Leroy. International Organizations: Principles and Issues (New Jersey:
Prentice Hall), 1991, p. 262.
143Conversation with Professor Carl Rosberg at the University of Berkeley, 8 April 1992.
144Yu, George, Contemporary African Op. Cit., 1991, p. 1.
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Keeping the lines of communication open with both Africa and
China is vital to fostering healthy relations. President Bush's decision to
renew most favored nation status was the right thing to do in dealing with
China. It is important to keep the lines of communication open between
Washington and Beijing.
Although some experts may argue that Africa has lost its strategic
value, potential for future regional conflict may make it advisable to have
access to military facilities, with port calls and visit rights. Without
cooperation from allies or non-allies the U.S. will not be able to meet its
desire for forward deployment as set forth in the National Military Strategy. 145
With the Chinese attempting to procure a aircraft carrier and SU-27 Aircraft
(capable of inflight refueling) from the former Soviet Union, it is wise to keep
our security options open in the African region. 146
If the United States chooses to ignore totally the development and
aspirations of Africa, it could very well find itself "on the outside looking in"
on a region that has great future potential.
For its own good, the United States should monitor China-Africa
relations very carefully. It would be inexcusable to lose the support and
goodwill of these important parts of the world simply because of carelessness
or neglect.
li5National Military Strategy of the United States, January 1992, p. 11.
146WuDunn, Cheryl. China Browses for Tanks, Aircraft and Carriers in Ex-Soviet Lands,
New York Times, 7 June 1992, p. A15.
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APPENDIX A. TIME LINE 1949-1992
CHINA/AFRICA/UNITED STATES
1949
CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
Fall of Nanjing and Beijing
Chiang Kai-Shek resigns
Nationalists withdraw to
island of Formosa (Taiwan)




UN General Assembly asks
members to respect
sovereignty of China
PRC demands ouster of KMT.
PRC recognized by USSR,
Eastern Europe
PRC seizes all American
assets
Race riots in South Africa
Apartheid instituted
Libya granted independence
Truman begins second term
Dean Acheson becomes
Secretary of State




DOD and JCS established
Mutual Defense Assistance
Act
U.S. issued a White Paper:
All Aid to Nationalist China
Cess.
1950





in the Korean War
U.S. recognizes PRC
Mao criticizes South African
discriminatory and anti-
Communist policies




New constitution in Nigeria
U.S. authorizes continuance of
H-bomb development





U.S.-led embargo on PRC
1951
CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
Tibet Agreement










Sudan rejects unification with
Egypt
Egypt restricts shipping in
Suez Canal
Truman declares that U.S.
would not bomb China
U.S. sends arms to Taiwan
John Foster Dulles attempts to
dissuade Britain from
allowing PRC participation
in Japan Peace Treaty
Proposal of Joint Middle East




PRC and USSR end joint
administration of Changchun
Railway
Anti-French riots in Tangier







Anti-French riots in Tunisia










John Foster Dulles becomes
Secretary of State
1953
CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
5-Year Plan initiative
PRC announces aid program





Zambia united with Southern
Rhodesia and Nyasaland
(and Malawi) become
Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland
Engagement of Public Safety
legislation in South Africa
Mau Mau insurrection (cont)
Sudan votes for complete
independence from Egypt
Japan occupation ends
U.S. ROK Treaty signed
Geneva Conference on Ind-
China
Walter Sisulu: Secretary General of African National
Congress (ANC) visits China
1954









H-bomb testing in Marshall
Islands
Potomac Charter, U.S. and
U.K.
1955
PRC and Taiwan battle in
Taiwan Straits
Egypt-Czech arms deal Pres. Eisenhower asks for
authorization to defend
Taiwan
Banding Conference attended by 29 states, Ethiopia, Egypt,
Ghana (Gold Coast), Liberia, Libya and Sudan attend
banding
PRC Egypt trade deal
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1956
CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
Ban on U.S. news reporters
lifted
Eighth Party Congress
Denial of U.N. seat
Missile development
commences
Tangjers unites with Morocco
Togo declared autonomous
republic
Sudan gains autonomy and
joins Arab League






U.S. supplies Israel with
arms
U.S. denies arms to Egypt
U.S. denies aid for Aswan
Dam
Eisenhower re-elected
Egypt recognizes PRC, establishes relations
GamaJ Nasser elected
President of Egypt
Egypt nationalizes Suez to
pay for Aswan Dam; gains
complete control
China endorses Egyptian actions at Suez and offers volunteers
to assist in running canal








Gold Coast and British
Togoland become Ghana after
gaining independence.
Kwama N. Nkrumah becomes
prime minister.
Abubakr Tafawa Balewa
becomes first prime minister
of Nigeria





Director of West Asia and Africa Affairs
Kio Hua visits Ghana
PRC sends aid to Algeria (FLN)
PRC delegations visit Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana, Morocco,
Sudan and Tunisia
Asia-African Solidarity Conference
PRC and USSR conflict on
Middle Eastern and African
policy
U.S. supplies Tunisia with arms despite French protest
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1958














Senegal gains autonomy from
France
Guinea gains independence
from France: Sekou Toure
president
Mali gains autonomy from
France
Ivory Coast gains autonomy
from France
Seventh Fleet escorts
Taiwanese convoy to Quemoy
U.K. decides not to support
U.S. in Quemoy crisis
U.S. PRC talks in Warsaw,
Poland
PRC establishes relations with Morocco and Algeria
Dahomey declared republic










French Somaliland chose to
remain a territory of France
Tunisia clashes with French
troops; joins Arab League
Egypt and Syria become UAR;
USSR lands 100 million for
construction of Aswan Dam
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1959
CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
Anti-Chinese Turmoil in
Tibet; Dalai Lama flees to
India; calls for U.N. action
vs. PRC
USSR voice support for PRC
quest for offshore islands
PRC-Guinea sign technical
agreement
Pres. Toure (Guinea) and Pres.
Nkrumah sign agreement for
a union of independent
African states
Senegal, Mali and Sudan for
Mali Federation: Hodibo
Keha Premier
Upper Volta gains autonomy
Anti-European rioting in
Congo (Kinshasa)
Bahutu uprising in Rwanda
ANC banned in Malawi
(British Nyasaland); riots
followed





PRC establishes relations with Sudan and Guinea
Senegal, Fr. Sudan, Ivory
Coast, Mauritania, Niger,
Volta and Dahomey form
Customs Union
1960
CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
Severe floods and droughts African nationalism in full
swing
Sit-in demonstration led by
martin Luther King
Civil Rights Act of 1960




Second Afro-Asian People Solidarity Organization Conference
(AAPSO)
USSR technician withdraw






Guinea leaves France Zone
and accepts USSR economic
aid
Sit-in demonstration led by
martin Luther King
Civil Rights Act of 1960






CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
China-Africa People's Friendship Association (CAPFA)
established
PRC gives economic aid to Guinea
Upper Volta gains full
independence
U.S. forces evaluation of base at Ben Simane (Morocco)



























British and Italian Somalia
























First U.S. space flight
PRC establishes relations with Congo, Tanganyika
AAPSO (Afro-Asian People Solidarity Organization)
Establishes Aid Committee to Algeria and Congo, PRC vice-
chair













Insurgency in Angola begins
Rwanda proclaimed a
republic
Burundi petition U.N. for
independence









Syria with draws from UAR
President Kennedy warns




CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
Sino-border War
Afro Asia without USSR
OAS established in Lagos,
Nigeria
Casablanca states and UAR
boycott OAS in support of
Algeria
India request aid via
President Kennedy
Lt. Col. John Glenn becomes
first president to make
orbital flight
Cuban Missile Crisis
Nasser mediates Sino-India War
Sino-Soviet rift widens
PRC-Indonesia discuss plan for




Algerian War ends; admitted




that U.S. would oppose any
unilateral intervention
Congo: U.S. submits plan to persuade Tshombe to accept plan
for uniting Congo states. Tshombe accepts
Sino-Soviet rift widens
PRC-Indonesia discuss plan for













PRC issue 200 of 400 African scholarships to Somalia
1963
PRC-USSR rift widens; PRC
identifies USSR as "white
men" who have no right to be
on African continent
CCP criticizes USSR for
military aid to India
Third Afro-Asian (AAPSO)
Conference
Cong: Tshombe flees as




shipments to Soutn Africa





Race riots in Birmingham
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Hotline (communication link)
established with USSR
Zhou En-Lai begins Africa tour to 10 African states
PRC loans Algeria 17 million
dollars









CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
Zhou En-Lai continues visits to UAR, Algeria, Morocco,
Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and
Rhodesia
Aid terminated to ROC
Civil Rights Bill
LBJ is elected





PRC signs Treaty with Yemen
Zhou En-Lai visits Burma,
Pakistan and Ceylon
PRC and USSR discuss border
disputes/convocation of World
Congress of Communist Parties
Tibet gains autonomy
Zhou En-Lai visits Moscow
First meeting of Organization
of African Unity (Cairo)
Boycott Portugal and South
Africa










merge to become Tanzania
PRC establishes relations with Zanzibar, Kenya, Burundi
PRC loans Algeria 17 million
dollars




Sudan depots 300 missionaries
USSR supports Somalia in
war with Kenya and
Ethiopia
Preparatory meeting for the Second Afro-Asian Conference
(Djakarta); PRC attempts to exclude USSR from conference
scheduled for 1965
World Federation of Scientific Workers participants urged to
present "broad united front against U.S. imperialism in
Vietnam




CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
Cultural Revolution (GPRCR)
PRC-Kuwait Trade Agreement
Third meeting of OAU
Collapse of Second Banding
Conference
Gambia gains independence
Ghana severs ties with
Rhodesia





PRC-Congo sign 10 year Treaty of Friendship






American Embassy bombed in
Saigon
PRC offers to build Tan-Zam Railway; preliminary team
begins survey
Lin Rao's "Lone live the
victory of People's War"
Tanzania severs British ties;




Third 5-year Plan aborted by
GPCR
Formation of Red Guards
PRC trade with noncommunist
countries flourishes
Guided missiles and nuclear
tests
Deng Xiaoping purged
OAU meeting at Addis




Beijing; coups ensues in Ghana
while on visit; reestablishes
ties with British and expels





Kenya: expulsion of pro-
communist forces
Vietnam War protests
Race riots continue in major
cities
President Johnson travels to




CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES




Race riots in Detroit




Detonation of hydrogen bomb Vietnam Peace March
PRC Nuclear, PRC builds hydroelectric plant in Testing (7th)
Guinea
Arab-Israeli War (6-day War)
Lin Rao's "Lone live the
victory of People's War"






with Kenyan and Somalian
leaders
Israel attacks USS Liberty
Justice Thurgood Marshall
confirmed to Supreme Court







bringing number to 42
President Johnson announces
refusal to seek re-election
U.S.-PRC talks in Warsaw
PRC builds railway between Mali and Guinea Tet offensive








CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
PRC and USSR border clashes
Ninth Party Congress meets in
secrecy (GPCR officially over)








U.S. relaxes trade restrictions
against PRC
Apollo II walk on moon
PRC, Zambia and Tanzania sign loan agreement for Tan-Zam
Railway
Nixon Doctrine
Sudan coup by junior officers
Eritrean Liberation Front
hijacks Ethiopian Airlines
Big Four talks about Middle
East
1970
PRC begins construction on Tan-Zam Railway Anti-war protests
PRC launches satellite
PRC reemerges in Africa via
friendship, cultural, technical
and delegations










British and U.S. base
Egypt's Nasser visits USSR;
dies succeeded by Anwar
Sadat
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
repealed
Kent State
Evacuation of U.S. troops
from Cambodia
Congress of African People
meeting in Atlanta
Secretary of State Rogers tours ten African countries
Congo: President Mobutu visits the United States
Ethiopia: Revelation of U.S. agreement which applied army




CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
Fourth 5-year Plan
PRC launched second satellite
Reorganization of CCP
PRC builds nuclear sub
Kissinger visits PRC
PRC formally admitted to
U.N.
PRC voted into U.N. African








South Africa Sugar Acts
Rep. Diggs walkout on U.N.
vote on Apartheid; later
resigns
Nixon visits USSR
ABN and SALT II Treaties
Watergate
Nixon reelected









Zambia: CBC holds first press conference in Africa pledged
support and deep affinity between African Americans and
Africans






and Bill of Rights; RT Africa




CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
10th Party Congress
Birth Control Campaign
France President visits PRC
PRC goes on force alert in
response to USSR activity
Deng Xiaoping reemerges
under patronage of Zhou En-
Lai






USSR threatens to intervene
in
CBC issues "the true state of
the union overview" in
response to Nixon's State of
the Union address
Oil crises: OPEC raises prices
300%
PRC establishes relations with Upper Volta
1974
Deng admitted to Politburo
Deng Xiaopingvisits UN;





Nixon resigns; Ford becomes
new president
PRC establishes relations with Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-
Bissau, Niger
1975







Deng Xiaoping visits France
PRC increases exports to
Kuwait
Cuba sends troops to Angola
Reduces ROC forces
Suspension of aid to Israel
USS Mayaguez incident
PRC, Zambia and Tanzania complete for Tan-Zam Railway
(TAZARA)
President Ford visits PRC
PRC's Third satellite CBC meets with Kissinger to
discuss US-Africa policy




CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
Fifth 5-year Plan •
Death of Zhou En-Lai;
succeeded by Hua Guofeng
Deng purged again
Mao Zedong dead
Gang of Four purged





Carter is elected president;
CBC drafts African-American
Manifesto on Southern Africa
Egyptian delegation visits PRC culminating in arms deal
PRC Muslims make Hajj to
Mecca




PRC becomes third largest
spender on arms behind US.
and USSR
Cuban troops in Ethiopia
Egypt cools relations with
USSR; border clashes with
Libya; Sadat visits Israel
Carter Doctrine
CBC initiates Brain Trust
system




Arms embargo to South Africa; Carter addresses U.N.
Death of Steven Biico in South Africa
First Anti-apartheid resolution (HCR 388)
PRC establishes relations with Liberia
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1978
CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
5th National People's
Congress
PRC steps up anti-USSR
rhetoric
1st 10-year Plan
PRC-EEC sign 5-year trade
agreement
Nonproliferation Act
EEC begins European Money
System
Carter okays sale of arms and
U.S. technology to PRC
1st PRC-US student exchange
resume
Sadat visits PRC
PRC-Japan sign 20b trade
agreement
USSR request talks to improve
PRC relations; PRC refuses
PRC-Japan Treaty of
Friendship
PRC supports Camp David
talks
Missile purchase from France
PRC-Taiwan reproachment
PRC establishes relations with Libya
1979
PRC normalizes relations with
U.S.
PRC clashes with Vietnam
PRC to participate in
Olympics
Successful ballistic missile test










Authorization of MX missile
Andrew Young resigns as U.N.
ambassador
Deng visits
Shah harbored in New York.
Iran hostage crisis
PRC establishes relations with Djibouti
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1980
CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
Base agreement with Kenya, Somalia and Oman
6th National Congress; Zhao
Ziyang becomes premier
PRC and U.S. coordinate aid
for Majahidin via Pakistan
PRC primary arms supplier for
Pakistan
Successful test of CSSX^t
ICBM
Gang of Four trial
Israel-South Africa nuclear
test




Iran hostage failed rescue
attempt
Vance resigns; succeeded by
Muskie
Boycott of Olympics
Computer sale to PRC
Reagan elected; A. Haig Sec
of State
Congressmen Gray and Solarz visit South Africa
1981




Trade surplus 6.1 billion with
other Third World countries




PRC launches three satellites





Haig: Reaffirms arms sales;
has strategic imperative
U.S. neutron bomb production
Sandra Day O'Connor first
female Supreme Court Justice
Trident sub launched
U.S.-Egypt 20 accord for two nuclear power plants
CBC calls for dismissal of
Jean Kirkpatrick for meeting
with South African military
officers















PRC-U.K. talks on H.K. begin
1st submarine missile
launched.
Zaire renews relations with
Israel
Shultz becomes Sec of State
Falklands War
Suspension of PRC nuclear
program
CBC attempts to block IMF loan to South Africa
1983
PRC high tech revolution
sweeping world
Zhao Ziyang on Today. Visit




Reagan "evil empire" speech
SDI research begins
DC government divests in
South. Africa
U.S. embassy in Beirut and
USMC barracks bombed






CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES




Zhao Ziyang visits U.S. as
well as defense minister
IMF approved 359.6 million




CBC calls for release of Nelson Mandela; escalation of
student protest
Reagan visits PRC; sign
Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement
Launch of first satellite
Statement in support of global
peace based on five principles
PRC-U.K. agree on Hong Kong
Arab countries consider PRC as
prime market investment
Jordanian contract to build four
nuclear plants in PRC
U.N. supports military aid to
Angola against South African
aggression




merging the two states




OAU holds annual conference
in Addis Ababa
Free South Africa protests
Reagan denounces apartheid
Rev. Tutu of South Africa meets with President Reagan
1985
Trade delegation to Jordan
Kuwait oil minister
Educational reform




Race riots in Eastern Cape of
South Africa
Israel Airlift Ethiopian Jews
Riots in Sudan
80 Asian African countries
meet in Bamdung, Indonesia
to mark 30th anniversary of
Asia Africa Conference
Sudan accepts military aid
from Libya
New Zealand refuses port
visit for U.S. nuclear ship
ASW sales to PRC
Sale of reactors and
nonmilitary technology
South Africa sanctions legislation introduced by Rep. Gray
and Deluns
Julius Nyrere steps down as
president of Tanzania
South Africans cross Angola
for preemptive strike against
SWAPO-guerrillas
Pope John Paul visits Togo,
Ivory Coast, Cameroon,
Zaire, Kenya, Morocco





President Reagan signs 1 million in aid to Mozambique
Chase Manhattan Bank suspends credit to South Africa
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1986
CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
PRC has relations with over
120 countries
Becomes 47th member of Asian
Bank
(Israel) Peres to Cameroon Explosion of Challenger
U.S. raid on Libya
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986
African student protest in Beijing
Egypt-PRC create Islamic Bank
President Reagan vetoes
Antiapartheia Act, veto is
overridden by both House and
Senate. Sanctions follow
Student protests for democratic
reforms
Central Committee reaffirms
policy of economic reforms





PRC negotiation to launch
Iranian satellite
Hu Yaobang resigns
Li Peng: PRC will not pull
back partial economic reforms
PRC-Portugal: return of Macao
(1999)
PRC increases troops on India
borders
PRC permanent outposts in
Spratley Islands
PRC refuses diplomatic
relations because of aggressive
foreign policy
U.S. withholds sales of high
tech items due to silkworm
sales
13th Party Congress; Deng
retires; zhao ziyane elected
(General Secretary) Li Peng
appointed premier
South Commission
established headed by Julius
NyTere;TRC donated 400,000
75 Israeli engineers work on




Flagging of Kuwaiti tankers
in Persian Gulf
USS Stark attacked by two
missiles (Iraq Exocets)
Citicorp loses 14.7 billion in
Third World loans
U.S. cancels support for Israel
Lavi aircraft
IMF treaty
Black Monday (Wall Street)
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1988
CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES









Li Peng calls for economic
reforms
Pakistan Test
PRC announces steps to control
inflation of 20-50%
Kenya renews relations with
Israel
Noriega indictment
Secstate Schultz Peace Plan
USS Roberts strikes mine




PRC students demonstrate against African students
1989
Increased military ties with
Pakistan, Iran, Saudis
Ties renewed with Indonesia
Tibet unrest
PRC premier visits Iran, Iraq,
Turkey, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi
Sino-Soviet Summit
Tiennamen Square; Zhao
Ziyane purged; Jing Zemin
named General Secretary
PRC warns Eastern Europe
against political changes
PRC solidifies economic ties
with Kuwait
PRC voices concern to USSR
over E. Europe events
Central African review ties
with Israel
S. African test new missile
with Israeli's
Ethiopia renews ties with
Israel
Yang Shamkun visits UAE,
Egypt, Kuwait, Oman











USjets shoot down Lybian
fignter
Milken fiasco affecting world
markets
EXXON oil spill
Oliver North convicted on
Iran-Contra scandal
PRC Sanctions for Tiennamen
Brent Scroncroft secretary
visits PRC
U.S. approves PRC satellite
purchases
San Francisco Quake






CHINA AFRICA UNITED STATES
PRC builds warships




Arrest of Non official
Christian leaders
Formation of new Hong Kong
constitution
Ethnic unrest in Xingiang
PRC renews Fulbright Program
Launch of commercial
satellites (27th)
Li Peng visits Moscow
Renewal of ties to Mongolia
Reemphesis on birth control







markets with assistance from
Chicago Board of Trade




Li Peng visits Indonesia and
Singapore
PRC allows foreign firms to sue
PRC wants to open stock
market
First nuclear war exercises
Asian Games
Supports Taiwan vs. Japan
over Ryukyu
Ethiopia denies plan to direct









Chad: Hissene Habre; fled
Nelson Mandela released
from prison






Executive order allows PRC
students to remain in U.S.
Pres. Bush renewed Most
Favored Nation status much
to consternation of Congress
Vice Pres. Quayle meets
with Chai Ling (PRC
dissident) in White House
U.S. named second largest
arms exporter
Iraq invades Kuwait.
Beginning of troop buildup
President Bush visits troops
U.S. writes off 7 billion
dollar Egyptian debt
Suspension of aid to
Pakistan due to nuclear
weapon research








Kuwaiti emir visits Beijing
Tiennamen activists receive
jail sentence
confer with Iraqis about Soviet
peace proposal
4th Session of the Seventh
National People's Congress on
25 March 1991
Gulf War; Zambia's Kenneth
Kaunda mediates secures
release of British hostages

















Zambia: Kaunda voted out




EC reports 30M Africans
affected by war and famine
Namibia gains independence:
visits PRC
Gulf War: Operation Desert
Storm
Baker visits Middle East
President Bush lifts economic
sanctions in South Africa
Bush extends Most Favored
Nation status to PRC without
conditions
PRC break off relations with G
C.A.R. resumed relations with '
mtral African Republic after
aiwan




Chinese foreign minister Quian Quichen tours six-country
African tour: Mali, Guinea, Senegal, La Cote d'lvoire, Ghana,
Namibia
Israel accused of transferring
patriot missile technology to
China
5th Session of the 7th
National People's Congress 20
March 1992
Referendum on Reform passes
in S. Africa 68-7 voted yes
Los Angeles riots after Los
Angeles after a jury acquits
the police officers who beat
Rodney King. Unrest reported
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